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Faultless Guilt: Toward a Relationship-Based Account of Criminal
Liability
Abstract
There is in the criminal law perhaps no principle more canonical than the fault principle, which holds that one
may be punished only where one is blameworthy, and one is blameworthy only where one is at fault. Courts,
criminal law scholars, moral philosophers, and textbook authors all take the fault principle to be the
foundational requirement for a just criminal law. Indeed, perceived threats to the fault principle in the
midtwentieth century yielded no less an achievement than the drafting of the Model Penal Code, which had as
its guiding purpose an effort to safeguard faultless conduct from criminal condemnation.
Yet notwithstanding its pedigree and predominance, I believe that the fault principle is false: Fault is not in
fact necessary for one to deserve blame and punishment. Instead, and as made plain by the broader account of
guilt I shall articulate here, one can be blameworthy, and so deserve punishment, even if one committed no
element of the crime, and merely because one bears a particular kind of relationship to the criminal. Just when
and why relationships, rather than fault, ought to ground criminal liability is what I seek to elucidate here.
To that end, the Article first interrogates the (very few) arguments made on behalf of the fault principle and
finds these wanting. The Article then presents cases and examples that illustrate how it is that one could be
blameworthy even though one is not at fault. Finally, the Article considers the criminal law implications for
individuals who are blameworthy without fault, and it concludes that at least some of these individuals
deserve prosecution and punishment.
This conclusion should not only shift our thinking about the conceptual relationships between blame, fault,
guilt, culpability, and criminal liability. It should also awaken us to salutary practical possibilities. For the
Article’s account, we shall see, ultimately provides a way to prosecute individuals who are widely regarded as
deserving criminal punishment (e.g., executives at banks responsible for the financial crisis) but whom the
fault principle currently places outside of the criminal law’s reach.
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FAULTLESS GUILT: TOWARD A RELATIONSHIP-BASED 
ACCOUNT OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
Amy J. Sepinwall* 
ABSTRACT 
There is in the criminal law perhaps no principle more canonical than 
the fault principle, which holds that one may be punished only where one 
is blameworthy, and one is blameworthy only where one is at fault. 
Courts, criminal law scholars, moral philosophers, and textbook authors 
all take the fault principle to be the foundational requirement for a just 
criminal law. Indeed, perceived threats to the fault principle in the mid-
twentieth century yielded no less an achievement than the drafting of the 
Model Penal Code, which had as its guiding purpose an effort to 
safeguard faultless conduct from criminal condemnation. 
Yet notwithstanding its pedigree and predominance, I believe that the 
fault principle is false: Fault is not in fact necessary for one to deserve 
blame and punishment. Instead, and as made plain by the broader 
account of guilt I shall articulate here, one can be blameworthy, and so 
deserve punishment, even if one committed no element of the crime, and 
merely because one bears a particular kind of relationship to the 
criminal. Just when and why relationships, rather than fault, ought to 
ground criminal liability is what I seek to elucidate here.  
To that end, the Article first interrogates the (very few) arguments 
made on behalf of the fault principle and finds these wanting. The 
Article then presents cases and examples that illustrate how it is that one 
could be blameworthy even though one is not at fault. Finally, the Article 
considers the criminal law implications for individuals who are 
blameworthy without fault, and it concludes that at least some of these 
individuals deserve prosecution and punishment. 
This conclusion should not only shift our thinking about the 
conceptual relationships between blame, fault, guilt, culpability, and 
criminal liability. It should also awaken us to salutary practical 
possibilities. For the Article’s account, we shall see, ultimately provides 
a way to prosecute individuals who are widely regarded as deserving 
criminal punishment (e.g., executives at banks responsible for the 
financial crisis) but whom the fault principle currently places outside of 
the criminal law’s reach. 
* James G. Campbell, Jr. Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. B.A., McGill University, 1997; M.A.,
McGill University, 1999; J.D., Yale Law School, 2004; Ph.D., Philosophy, Georgetown
[Note to reader:  The Article’s positive account begins in Part IV. 
Readers pressed for time might read the Introduction and then skip the 
arguments and preliminaries set forth in Parts I-III.]  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A. The False Fault Principle 
 
Among the orthodoxies pervading criminal law doctrine and theory 
perhaps none is so well entrenched as the fault principle, which holds 
that one may be punished only where one is blameworthy,1 and one is 
blameworthy only where one is at fault.2 Courts have deemed the fault 																																																								
1 See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Just Punishment in an Imperfect World, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 1263, 1265 (1989) (reviewing DAVID L. BAZELON, QUESTIONING AUTHORITY: 
JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL LAW (1988) and attributing to Bazelon the view that, in 
“mainstream academic thinking: “‘Our collective conscience does not allow 
punishment where it cannot impose blame.’” (quoting BAZELON, supra note 1, at 8)). 
2 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, The Moral Methaphysics of Causation and Results, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 879, 879 (2000) (“[V]irtually all criminal law theorists agree that moral 
fault is at least a necessary condition of blame and punishment . . . .”); Schulhofer, 
supra note 1, at 1265 (citing Bazelon for the claim that “blame attaches only when the 
defendant can be found at fault according to prevailing community standards”); James 
J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the Forces That 
Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1448 (1994) (“Modern 
scholarly and judicial thought considers fault for every element of an offense to be an 
essential predicate for blame, responsibility, and punishment.”); cf. Sanford H. Kadish, 
Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 264 (1985) (“[C]riminal conviction charges a 
moral fault . . . .”); Antony Duff, Theories of Criminal Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL. (May 14, 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/criminal-law/ (attributing to 
H.L.A. Hart the view that “those who lack fault should not be liable to criminal 
punishment”). 
The locus of fault in the criminal law has traditionally been in the mens rea or 
mental state requirement. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND *20–22 (“[T]o constitute a crime against human laws, there must 
be, first, a vitious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vitious 
will.”); 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW (John M. Zane & Carl 
Zollman eds., 9th ed. 1923) § 287 (“[T]here can be no crime, large or small, without an 
evil mind”); Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. 
L. REV. 75, 81 (1908) (“It is a fundamental principle of the criminal law, for which no 
authorities need be cited, that the doer of a criminal act shall not be punished unless he 
has a criminal mind.”); Williamson v. Norris [1898] 1 QB 7 [14] (Lord Russell, CJ) 
(UK) (“The general rule of English law is, that no crime can be committed unless there 
is mens rea.”); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952) (“‘It is alike the 
general rule of law, and the dictate of natural justice that to constitute guilt there must 
be not only a wrongful act, but a criminal intention.’” (quoting People v. Flack, 26 N.E. 
267, 270 (N.Y. 1891))); Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and 
Innocents: The Supreme Court and Mens Rea Since Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 859, 860 (1999) (“This concern with whether the conduct of the defendant 
principle the foundational principle in criminal law,3 and it is a standard 
fixture in criminal law textbooks and scholarship.4 Much moral theory 																																																																																																																																							
manifested an evil mind reflects a basic and fundamental principle of justice: Only the 
blameworthy (guilty), and not the blameless (innocent), should be punished.”). 
3 Prosecutor v. Tadíc, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 186, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); cf. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 286 
(1943) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“It is a fundamental principle of Anglo-Saxon 
jurisprudence that guilt is personal and that it ought not lightly to be imputed to a 
citizen who . . . has no evil intention or consciousness of wrongdoing.”). But cf. Peter 
Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between 
Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1513 n.2 (1992) (“The 
United States Constitution generally does not require the legislature to incorporate 
moral culpability principles into its definitions of crimes.”). See generally Richard H.S. 
Tur, Justifications of Reverse Discrimination, in LAW, MORALITY AND RIGHTS 259, 274 
(M.A. Stewart ed., 1983) (“[T]he ‘fault principle’ is the basis . . . of the criminal law of 
at least the western world.”); James G. Stewart, The Accomplice Liability of Arms 
Vendors 18 & n.42 (July 11, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“If 
there is anything approaching universal agreement in criminal theory, it might be that 
only the guilty should be punished.”). By way of evidence, Arenella goes on to cite 
strict liability crimes. Arenella, supra note 3, at 1513 n.2. I distinguish strict liability 
crimes from the ground of criminal liability. See infra text accompanying notes 20–21. 
At any rate, even Arenella recognizes that the “criminal law does, however, tie legal to 
moral blame for serious mala in se crimes punishable by prolonged confinement or 
death.” Id. at 1513 (footnote omitted). 
4 For textbook articulations of the fault principle, see, for example, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 100 (1978); 
JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 325–59 (2d ed. 1960) 
(claiming that faultless criminal liability is incompatible with any civilized, rational, 
and moral system of penal law). 
For criminal law scholarship insisting upon the fault principle, see, for example, 
Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 109 
(arguing vigorously against strict liability crimes); cf. Singer & Husak, supra note 2 
(reviewing recent Supreme Court jurisprudence and finding an almost unwavering 
commitment to a mens rea requirement, which the authors endorse). Other theorists 
acknowledge, but decry, departures from the fault principle. See, e.g., Phillip E. 
Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1137 (1973); 
Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: 
New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (1985) (objecting to treating 
accomplices as no less culpable than principals even when the accomplice makes no 
causal contribution to the offense); Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning 
Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1772 (2005) (objecting to 
the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise because it ensnares innocents along with the 
guilty); Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of 
Subordinates or Separate Offence of the Superior?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 619, 633 
(2007) (railing against the practice of holding commanders responsible for a crime of 
their subordinates on the ground that “no one, in fact, can be punished for a wrongful 
act unless the act is attributable to him”).  
One can find the occasional defense of the few criminal law doctrines that depart 
from the fault principle, but these defenses tend to proceed on deterrence or prudential 
grounds, and not on grounds of desert. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal 
Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 658 (1984) (noting situations like strict criminal liability 
and Pinkerton liability “in which furtherance of the utilitarian goal of deterrence 
embraces the fault principle as well.5 So sacrosanct is the fault principle 
that apparent threats to it prompted the drafting of the Model Penal 
Code, whose guiding purpose was to “safeguard conduct that is without 
fault from condemnation as criminal.”6 Recent efforts at federal criminal 
law reform also aim to buttress the fault principle. These have garnered 
support from both Houses,7 and both sides of the political aisle,8 on the 
unifying thought that, as Gideon Yaffe puts it in his own endorsement of 
the bills, “[n]o one should be convicted of a crime . . . without evidence 
of a criminal state of mind.”9  
Notwithstanding the fault principle’s pedigree and predominance, 
however, this article contends that the fault principle is false. Now, there 
is one sense in which this contention is trivially true: our criminal law 
includes strict liability crimes.10 The getaway driver for a bank robbery 																																																																																																																																							
disregards principles of culpability”); cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 
YALE L.J. 1307 (2003) (advancing a prudential theory to defend Pinkerton liability). 
But see Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
965 (2008) (offering a retributive defense of felony-murder). 
Further, even those who advance an economic analysis of the criminal law 
nonetheless recognize the connection between fault and wrong. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow 
& Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 973 (2001) (“[I]t 
is, after all, wrongs that give rise to the need for retribution . . . .”). Finally, strict 
liability—or liability without fault—has been decried in the civil context, too. See, e.g., 
Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 819, 821 & n.4 
(1992) (arguing that most of the key assumptions of strict liability should be rejected).  
5 See, e.g., Susan Wolf, The Moral of Moral Luck, 31 PHILOSOPHIC EXCHANGE 5, 16 
(2001) (arguing blameworthiness to be solely a function of faultiness); cf. Miranda 
Fricker, What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation, 50 NOÛS 165, 170 
(2016) (“[A] minimal definition of blame [would] essentially incorporat[e] a kind of 
judgment: a finding fault with someone for their (inward or outward) conduct.”). See 
generally Arenella, supra note 3, at 1518–20 (listing conditions that must be satisfied 
before an individual deserves moral blame for conduct). 
6 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2015); see also Alan C. Michaels, 
Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 831–32 (1999) (describing the 
Model Penal Code’s attitude here as a “‘frontal assault’ on strict liability, [and so] 
requiring culpability for all crimes in the Code”). See generally Paul H. Robinson & 
Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief Overview, 10 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 319 (2007) (discussing the history, influence, and innovations of the 
Model Penal Code).  
7 See Mens Rea Reform Act of 2015, S. 2298, 114th Cong. (2015); Criminal Code 
Improvement Act of 2015, H.R. 4002, 114th Cong. (2015). 
8 See, e.g., Russell Berman, Can the Senate Reform Criminal Justice?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 
2, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/will-criminal-justice-
actually-be-reformed/408538/ (“[T]he introduction of Senate legislation . . . has the 
backing of key leaders in both parties.”). 
9 Gideon Yaffe, A Republican Crime Proposal That Democrats Should Back, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/opinion/a-republican-
crime-proposal-that-democrats-should-back.html. But see Rena Steinzor, Dangerous 
Bedfellows, AM. PROSPECT (May 11, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/dangerous-
bedfellows. 
10 For prominent texts describing and critiquing strict criminal liability, see, for 
can be convicted of murder if one of his co-felons accidentally fires his 
gun and kills in the course of the robbery.11 A man can be convicted of 
mail fraud, even if he was in prison at the time the fraud occurred, so 
long as it was part of an ongoing conspiracy in which he is involved.12 A 
CEO can be convicted of a rodent infestation at one of the company 
warehouses even if he has taken all reasonable measures to address the 
infestation.13 So it is obvious that the fault principle, at least as a positive 
claim, is mistaken: contrary to the fault principle, one can be criminally 
liable even if one is not at fault. Moreover, the strict liability these cases 
evidence is no new feature of the modern regulatory state; instead, it is a 
fixture of the Ancients’ responsibility practice.14 The problem is that the 
fault principle has come to so dominate our conception of responsibility 
that we have lost sight of the rationale for this more expansive 
responsibility practice.  
This Article aims to unseat the fault principle as the exclusive source 
of guilt and to recover the rationale for non-fault-based liability to blame. 
Contrary to the fault principle, one can be blameworthy even if one is not 
at fault. Further, one can sometimes deserve prosecution and punishment 
because one is blameworthy, even though one is not at fault.  
On the account to be advanced here, it is relationships, rather than 
fault, that ground blame.15 Thus, for example, a parent should sometimes 																																																																																																																																							
example, Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. 
REV. 731 (1960); Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: The Rise and Fall 
of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337 (1989). 
11 See, e.g., The California Felony-Murder Rule, Shouse Cal. L. Group, 
http://www.shouselaw.com/felony-murder.html (last visited July 11, 2016). 
12 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646–47 (1946). 
13 See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673–74 (1975). 
14 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. TALBOTT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING 147–49 
(2010) (discussing examples of strict liability from ancient Greece, the Bible, and 
Japanese culture); cf. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, ROMANTICS AT WAR: GLORY AND GUILT 
IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM 181–87, 205 (2002) (commenting on ancient notions of 
pollution, or guilt by association, which are forms of strict liability). 
15 A handful of other scholars have offered non-fault based accounts of guilt. See, e.g., 
Herbert Morris, Nonmoral Guilt, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: 
NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 220, 237–40 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) 
(describing vicarious guilt); KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT 65 (E.B. 
Ashton trans., 2001) (describing “metaphysical guilt”); Scott A. Anderson, 
Rationalizing Indirect Guilt, 33 VT. L. REV. 519, 521 (2009) (describing survivor guilt). 
These accounts differ from the one here, however, in part because they do not depend 
on family or family-like relationships and, more significantly still, because whether one 
experiences the emotion these authors describe is entirely at one’s discretion. See Amy 
J. Sepinwall, Citizen Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes: Blaming Americans for 
War Crimes in Iraq, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR COLLECTIVE WRONGDOING 231 (Tracy 
Isaacs & Richard Vernon eds., 2011). By contrast, faultless guilt, as I conceive of it, is 
normative: it is the emotion one ought to experience in light of one’s relationship to the 
wrong or the wrongdoer. 
be blamed for the wrongs of her child,16, even if she is not culpable for 
these wrongs and even if she has parented well.17 Furthermore, a 
corporate executive should sometimes be blamed and perhaps even 
punished for the crimes of his corporation, even if he did not participate 
in these crimes, and even if he too could not have prevented them.18 
Further, the reasons justifying blame and punishment in these 
relationship-based cases are not—or not purely—instrumental: instead, 
in blaming and punishing we give these individuals what they deserve.19 
Relationship-based criminal liability shares some of the features of 
strict and vicarious criminal liability but is nevertheless distinct from 
them.20 The justification for strict criminal liability lies in concerns for 
public welfare;21 the justification for vicarious criminal liability lies in 																																																								
16 For an explanation of the use of gendered pronouns in this Article, see infra note 91. 
17 I note here that my position is just the opposite of David Enoch’s take on parents’ 
responsibility for crimes of their children. Enoch writes: “I am an individualist about 
moral responsibility—I believe that you cannot be morally responsible for something 
simply in virtue of being in a certain relationship with someone else who is morally 
responsible for that thing . . . .” David Enoch, Being Responsible, Taking 
Responsibility, and Penumbral Agency, in LUCK, VALUE & COMMITMENT: THEMES 
FROM THE ETHICS OF BERNARD WILLIAMS 95, 97–98 (Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang 
eds., 2012). I address Enoch’s account infra note 161–62. 
18 The Responsible Corporate Officer (“RCO”) doctrine already allows for the 
prosecution and punishment of an executive for a crime of his corporation to which the 
executive did not contribute. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279–81 
(1943). Still, the doctrine is much reviled. See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think 
About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1376–77 (2009) 
(comparing the RCO doctrine to the ancient legal practice of frankpledge). And, as I 
have argued elsewhere, attempts to defend the RCO doctrine turn on public policy, and 
not desert-based grounds. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Crossing the Fault Line in Corporate 
Criminal Law, 40 J. CORP. L. 439 (2015) [hereinafter Sepinwall, Crossing the Fault 
Line]; Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsible Shares and Shared Responsibility: In Defense of 
Responsible Corporate Officer Liability, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 371. 
19 Paul Robinson also invokes cases involving parents and corporate executives in his 
erudite and incisive treatment of vicarious criminal liability. Robinson, supra note 4, at 
618 & nn.26–27. While Robinson thus studies the kinds of cases discussed here, his 
interest is analytic, not critical or justificatory. See id. at 613. 
20 Strict criminal liability typically requires that the defendant have satisfied the act 
element of the crime. See, e.g., Steven S. Nemerson, Note, Criminal Liability Without 
Fault: A Philosophical Perspective, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1517, 1529 (1975); cf. 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that some willed act is a 
necessary condition for criminal liability). Liability is strict just insofar as the defendant 
need not have had, or did not have, a culpable mental state. See Douglas Husak, Strict 
Liability, Justice and Proportionality, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW: 
SELECTED ESSAYS 152, 154 (2010). The individuals I contemplate need not have 
participated in the criminal act at all; in fact, in none of the cases I discuss will the 
defendant have taken any part in the crime. Criminal liability is for these defendants 
nonetheless strict because neither their mental state nor the impossibility of their having 
done anything to prevent the crime is relevant in determining their susceptibility to 
prosecution and punishment. 
21 The paradigmatic case here is Dotterweich. See 320 U.S. 277; see also Francis Bowes 
the defendant’s own wrongdoing.22 By contrast, the justification for 
assigning criminal liability on the account here arises from the nature of 
the relationship between the defendant and the wrongdoer. More 
specifically, I shall argue that imputed criminal liability is—in 
circumstances to be delineated here—conceptually and normatively 
required by the relationships at issue.  
Moreover, it is not just that the individuals in these relationships have 
reason to think themselves blameworthy. We, impartial members of the 
moral community, also sometimes have reason to see these individuals 
as blameworthy, and so too join these individuals in blaming themselves. 
And sometimes we have reason to treat their blameworthiness as a 
ground of criminal liability. The work of this Article lies in spelling out 
when and why, contra the fault principle, this is so. 
One might think that the effort to provide grounds for blame 
independent of fault is worse than worthless, nefarious even. If anything, 
the criminal justice system is rife with too many prosecutions, too many 
convictions, and too many people in jail—to say nothing of the problem 
of over-criminalization more generally.23 My aim is not to add to this 																																																																																																																																							
Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 68–70 (1933) (discussing 
public welfare offenses that do not need proof of individual blameworthiness); Francis 
Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689, 
720 (1930) (discussing two conflicting interests: first, the important social interest in 
well-being and security; and second, individual liberty interest of a defendant in not 
being punished if not morally blameworthy); JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 176 (5th ed. 2009) (describing the view that mens rea 
may be foregone for public welfare offenses if the penalty is light and does not include 
imprisonment); Paul H. Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Mar. 1995, at 72 (discussing how moral authority in a criminal justice system could 
help reduce violent crime); Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime To Tear the Tag Off a 
Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 
EMORY L.J. 1533, 1610 (1997) (discussing how violation of minor regulatory laws can 
be socially harmful); Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From 
Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 779 (2005) 
(noting that evidence shows more states enacting strict liability and public welfare 
offenses). 
22 Vicarious criminal liability arises only in cases where the defendant is already 
engaged in some crime with the others whose additional criminal acts are then imputed 
to him. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Estelle, 718 F.2d 730, 735–36 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[S]hared 
purpose to achieve jointly held illegal aims is the common thread among the diverse 
doctrines of vicarious criminal responsibility.”). In the cases under consideration here, 
the defendant need not be involved in the wrongdoer’s crime at all. 
23 See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 3–45 (2008); SANFORD H. KADISH, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, in BLAME 
AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 21 (1987); SANFORD H. KADISH, 
More on Overcriminalization, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 36 (1987); SANFORD H. KADISH, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing 
Economic Regulations, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 40 
(1987). 
state of affairs, which I along with many others deplore.24 But curiously, 
the rampant prosecution and punishment does not extend from the street 
to the suite.25 For example, we now know that widespread bank fraud 
underlay the financial crisis of 2008, and yet only a handful of banking 
executives were prosecuted and not a single one went to jail.26 And while 
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced its new strategy of 
targeting high-level executives in addressing corporate crime in Fall 
2015,27 it has no desert-based justification to support its “crackdown,”28 
and it has been accused of being “impractical” and out of touch with 
reality.29 The Article has its ultimate payoff, then, in an account that 
would justify the very strategy the DOJ has identified as crucial to 
redressing organizational crime.  
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I clarify some of the key 
terminology the Article employs. Part II seeks to motivate the claim that 
fault is not a necessary condition for warranted blame by interrogating 																																																								
24 See, e.g., HUSAK, supra note 23; Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, supra 
note 23, at 33.  
25 See, e.g., Robert Kuttner, America Should Send More People to Prison, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-kuttner/america-should-
send-more-_b_6591730.html (“The multiple frauds that produced the financial 
collapse, and cost ordinary people trillions of dollars in lost savings, lost homes and lost 
jobs, did not result in a single banking executive going to prison.”); Joe Nocera, 
Opinion, How to Prevent Oil Spills, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/14/opinion/nocera-how-to-prevent-oil-spills.html 
(suggesting that jail time would be more effective than fines to prevent corporate 
crimes); 155 CONG. REC. S2315–16 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2009). 
Other commentators have argued for the obverse claim—namely, that prosecutions 
for street crime should be more like those for white-collar crimes. For example, Sara 
Sun Beale argues that defendants accused of street crimes should enjoy more of the 
protections afforded to white-collar criminals. Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal 
Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1503 (2007). But see Samuel W. Buell, Is the 
White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE L.J. 823 (2014) (arguing that in fact it is 
easier to prosecute and convict white-collar defendants).  
In a similar vein, Darryl Brown contends that the pluralist aims of white-collar 
prosecutions should apply as well in prosecutions for street crimes. Darryl K. Brown, 
Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1295, 1345–60 (2001). These commentators are pursuing worthy agendas but 
the ambition here is more far-reaching, since I seek to enlarge the set of individuals 
appropriately liable to white-collar prosecutions in the first place. 
26 Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2011), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216. 
27 Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., on Individual 
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download. 
28 Former Deputy AG James Cole Says DOJ’s New White-Collar Crime Policy is 
'Impractical', A.B.A NEWS (Nov. 24, 2015), 
http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-
archives/2015/11/former_deputy_agjam.html. 
29 Id. 
the fault principle. The fault principle is so entrenched that virtually no 
one bothers to argue for it anymore. The arguments instead attack 
departures from the principle—none of which are convincing. Part III 
begins the Article’s positive theoretical work. There, I refine the notions 
of blame, accepting blame, and being blameworthy that I use here. I then 
turn in Part IV to a lengthy examination of cases in which, progressively, 
the connection between fault and blame comes apart. Much of the 
discussion in this Part concerns moral psychology; almost none of it 
concerns punishment. Nonetheless, this lengthy excursion into our moral 
emotional reactions is warranted since the criminal law’s conception of 
desert depends on a moral conception of desert.30 Thus a defendant 
would not deserve punishment if he did not satisfy the conditions 
necessary for moral blame.31 If we are to determine whether one may 
deserve punishment even if one is not at fault, we must then first 
determine whether one may be morally to blame even if one is not at 
fault. This is the task of Part IV. The Article’s Conclusion seeks to draw 
out the implications of the cases in Part IV for punishment. 
Before turning to the Article’s arguments it will be useful to clarify 
terminology.  
 
I. SOME PRELIMINARY GROUND CLEARING 
 
The notions of fault and blame are so intertwined in criminal law 
doctrine and theory that the central claim of this Article—that one can be 
blameworthy even if one is not at fault—may well come across as 																																																								
30 See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187–88 (1997) (noting that a 
criminal prosecutor must not only prove facts, but must do so in a way sufficient “to 
implicate the law’s moral underpinnings and a juror’s obligation to sit in judgment” and 
[t]hus, the prosecutor may fairly seek to place its evidence before the jurors . . . to 
convince the jurors that a guilty verdict would be morally reasonable”); Tison v. 
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 171 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting “‘the relation 
between criminal liability and moral culpability’ on which criminal justice depends” 
(quoting People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783 (1965))). For discussions noting 
the ascendancy of retributivist justifications for punishment, see Russell L. Christopher, 
Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just" Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 
846–47 (2002) (“The U.S. Supreme Court, state courts, state legislatures, philosophers, 
and legal scholars alike are increasingly acknowledging retributivism as the dominant 
theory of punishment.” (footnotes omitted)); Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged 
Philosophies of Punishment, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2012) (noting “a robust 
revival of retributivism”). 
31 This is not of course to say that it would be illegal to punish him. Malum prohibitum 
offenses involve precisely the punishment of one who is (or at least who may be) 
blameless; the same can be said for strict criminal liability. But cf. Husak, supra note 
20, at 158 (distinguishing between formal and substantive strict criminal liability, and 
arguing that in a case of formal strict criminal liability, the defendant might well have 
possessed a culpable mental state; it is just that the state does not require that this be 
proven in order to obtain a conviction). 
incoherent. But it is not. Establishing that it is not will require that we get 
clear on definitions. 
In criminal law, to be at fault is to have committed a wrong without 
justification or excuse.32 Depending on the jurist or theorist, fault is 
either a necessary condition for blameworthiness,33 or fault and 
blameworthiness are interchangeable, or one and the same thing.34 Either 
way, the claim that one can be blameworthy even though one is not at 
fault will seem, to these jurists and theorists, nonsensical. But if one 
allows that a person can be blameworthy even if he or she is not at fault 
then the standard assertion that criminal liability requires fault will seem 
to do no more than beg the question.35  
Here is a starting definition of blameworthiness that neither implies 
nor denies that fault is necessary for blame: an individual is morally 
blameworthy if we have good moral reasons to blame her.  Being at fault 
																																																								
32 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (defining faulty 
conduct as “conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial 
harm to individual or public interests”); John Gardner, Wrongs and Faults, in 
APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 51, 63 (A.P. Simester ed., 2005) (defining fault as “a 
shortfall of virtue that consists in the performance of actions that are both unjustified 
and unexcused”).  
33 See supra note 2 (collecting cites reporting that the criminal law does and should 
impose blame only where the defendant is at fault). 
34 See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 943, 945 (2000) (“Fault—also known as desert, culpability, or 
blameworthiness—is the distinctive feature of the criminal law.” (footnote omitted)); 
Husak, supra note 20, at 162–63 (“Any acceptable justification of punishment 
presupposes desert, which requires blame or fault in the defendant.”). To say that fault 
and blameworthiness are interchangeable is to say that there is complete overlap 
between conduct that is faulty and conduct that is blameworthy (i.e., the two have 
identical extensions); to say that fault and blameworthiness are one and the same thing 
is to say that they have the same definition (i.e., identical intensions). 
35 Consider, for example, Herbert Packer’s contention that “moral blameworthiness 
should be the indispensable condition precedent to [the] application [of the criminal 
law].” Herbert Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 
147–48. One can agree and yet still hold that one can be morally blameworthy in the 
absence of fault. Or, for an especially vitriolic example, consider F. H. Bradley’s 
argument: 
 
Punishment is punishment, only where it is deserved. We pay the 
penalty, because we owe it, and for no other reason; and if 
punishment is inflicted for any other reason whatever than because it 
is merited by wrong, it is a gross immorality, a crying injustice, an 
abominable crime, and not what it pretends to be. 
 
F.H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 26–27 (2d ed. 1927). One who holds my view can 
assent to the first two propositions—that punishments and penalties should be imposed 
only on those who deserve or owe them—but deny that only those who have done 
wrong can deserve punishment or owe penalties. 
is certainly one set of such reasons—indeed, the paradigmatic one.36 But 
it is not the only one. 
A necessary innovation for getting the argument off the ground will 
be the construction of a vocabulary that does not simply conflate fault 
with blameworthiness. I stipulate that one must be blameworthy if one is 
to be appropriately subject to criminal liability. So far so good, as far as 
the fault principle goes. But, against that principle, I will argue that there 
are two broad grounds of blameworthiness, and only one is necessary to 
ground blame. First and familiarly, one will be presumptively 
blameworthy if one is at fault; second, one will be presumptively 
blameworthy if one stands in the right kind of relationship to a wrong or 
wrongdoer, even if one is not at fault. (The reason for which blame is 
presumptive rather than conclusive will be made clear in what follows.)37 
I shall refer to blame arising in the first way as fault-based and to blame 
arising in the second as relational. To keep these two grounds of blame 
distinct, I will reserve the terms “wrongdoing” and “culpable” (and their 
associated adjectives, adverbs, etc.) for those cases where blame turns on 
fault.38 The person who is blameworthy on relational grounds will then 
be “non-culpable.” Finally, the term “guilt” here refers to the moral and 
psychological concept, not to eligibility for conviction for a crime 
(unless otherwise indicated). More specifically, “guilt” and 
“blameworthy” are correlates: one bears appropriate guilt if and only if 
one is blameworthy.39 It follows then that one can be guilty on my 
account because one is at fault or because one stands in a blame-
grounding relationship. 
 
II. W(H)ITHER DEFENSES OF THE FAULT PRINCIPLE? 
 
Given the sanctity of the fault principle, one might think it beyond 
inquiry. Yet it is precisely because the fault principle has risen to the 																																																								
36 Cf. Christopher Kutz, Causeless Complicity, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 289, 294 (2007) 
(arguing that the requirement that one make a causal difference to a crime is merely the 
paradigmatic, but not the only, case of blameworthy complicity). 
37 See infra Section IV.A.3 and Section IV.B.  
38 Culpability is typically associated with fault in criminal law doctrine. See, e.g., 
MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.05, cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft 
and Revised Comments 1985) (“Crime does and should mean condemnation and no 
court should have to pass that judgment unless it can declare that the defendant’s act 
was culpable.” (footnote omitted)).  Under section 2.02(1), culpable means minimally 
that the defendant “acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently . . . with 
respect to each material element of the offense.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (AM. 
LAW INST. 2015). 
39 Bernard Williams describes the appropriate emotional response for the person who 
faultlessly causes harm as “agent-regret.” BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK 30 
(1981). I discuss the relationship between faultless guilt and agent-regret infra, see 
Section IV.A.2. 
level of established dogma that the justification for it no longer 
accompanies its appearance,40 and one who dares to wonder about its 
foundations is left wanting. 
There is of course an account frequently given to explain why the 
state ought to be bound by the fault principle: the state is the entity 
exclusively empowered to punish, punishments are things citizens want 
to avoid,41 so the elements licensing punishment should be of the kind 
citizens have the opportunity to avoid.42 The fault principle (along with 
the voluntary act requirement)43 ensures that individuals will not be 
punished for acts they could not avoid—those that the agent does not 
will (e.g., those performed while she is unconscious),44 or performed in 
innocent ignorance of the risk they impose,45 or under circumstances that 
compel or coerce the agent’s criminal conduct.46 In this way, individuals 
can protect themselves from the threat of state punishment, because they 																																																								
40 Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 1232–33 (“The rationale for the retributive 
conception of fairness has proved difficult to identify. . . . [W]e do note that, to us (and 
to many others), the justifications usually offered [for the claim that wrongdoing 
deserves punishment] seem virtually indistinguishable from restatements of the 
definition of the notion of retribution.” (footnote omitted)). 
41 See, e.g., Peter Cane, Responsibility and Fault: A Relational and Functional 
Approach to Responsibility, in RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS FOR TONY 
HONORÉ ON HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 81, 108 (Peter Cane & John Gardner eds., 2001) 
(“As agents, we have an interest in freedom of action, in being able to act without 
incurring the serious penalties and blame that attach to criminal responsibility.”). 
42 The view is most famously associated with H.L.A. Hart. See H.L.A. HART, 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 181 (1968) (“[U]nless a man has the capacity and a 
fair opportunity or chance to adjust his behaviour to the law its penalties ought not be 
applied to him.”); see also NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES 
AND COMMUNITY VALUES 146 (1988) (“Both rationality and the capacity for 
responsible action are thus for liberalism at once factual features of human nature and 
sources of normative limits on the ways in which human beings may be treated, 
particularly by political and other public institutions.”). 
43 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (“A person is not guilty of an offense unless 
his liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act . . . .”); Gideon Yaffe, The 
Voluntary Act Requirement, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 174, 174 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012). 
44 For a volitional account of the act requirement, see, for example, MICHAEL S. 
MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CRIMINAL LAW (1993). For an argument against this view, and urging that we restrict 
criminal liability not to the (narrower set) of voluntary acts but instead to the (broader 
set) of acts reflecting our practical agency, see Vincent Chiao, Action and Agency in the 
Criminal Law, 15 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2009).  
45 See, e.g., Rollin M. Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. 
REV. 35, 35 (1939) (“[M]istake of fact is sufficient for exculpation if what was done 
would have been lawful had the facts been as they were reasonably supposed to be.”). 
46 See, e.g., Monu Bedi, Excusing Behavior: Reclassifying the Federal Common Law 
Defenses of Duress and Necessity Relying on the Victim’s Role, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 575, 577 (2011) (describing the role that compulsion and coercion play 
in protecting the defendant from criminal liability). 
can be assured that the circumstances warranting punishment are within 
their control.47 
Whatever the merits of the argument that fault is necessary for the 
state to punish, the argument cannot justify the fault principle as it is 
generally construed because that principle is invoked not merely as a 
limit on state action. Instead, it is taken to enshrine a fundamental moral 
commitment about desert. To take one emblematic statement: “[a]ny 
acceptable justification of punishment presupposes desert, which 
requires blame or fault in the defendant.”48 To question the fault 
principle on its face, rather than its use as a constraint on state action, is 
then to ask why only those who are at fault—that is, only those who 
commit a wrong without justification or excuse49—deserve blame. 
The answer, such as it is, proceeds not by way of a positive defense 
of the fault principle so much as a series of arguments against blame or 
punishment without fault. I address each of these in turn and, finding 
none of them compelling, reflect on why the fault principle has 
nonetheless managed to grip us so tenaciously. 
  
A. Voluntarism 
 
Those with voluntarist commitments hold that we should be blamed 
only where we have chosen to engage in conduct that we know or should 
know is wrong.50 To impose blame where we could not have done other 
than what we did, or for the acts of someone whom we cannot control or 
have no duty to control, is to hold us responsible for something outside 
of our agency,51 and so to treat us more harshly than we deserve. 																																																								
47 I go on to challenge the criminal law’s voluntarist commitment below. See infra 
Section II.A. 
48 Husak, supra note 20, 162–63; see also Douglas N. Husak, Why Punish the 
Deserving?, 26 NOÛS 447, 447–48 (1992) (suggesting that voluntary commission of a 
crime is necessary to deserve punishment by stating “[t]he voluntary choice of the agent 
to commit a crime he knows is subject to punishment is crucial in establishing his 
desert”); cf. ANDREW VON HIRSH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 51 
(1976) (“The offender may justly be subjected to certain deprivations because he 
deserves it; and he deserves it because he has engaged in wrongful conduct—conduct 
that does or threatens injury and that is prohibited by law.”). 
49 See supra note 31. 
50 See, e.g., HART, supra note 41, at 181; LACEY, supra note 41, at 146.  
51 Those who subscribe to voluntarism believe, contrary to “hard determinists,” see, 
e.g., Luis E. Chiesa, Punishing Without Free Will, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1403, 1408 n.41 
(2011), that there is a meaningful distinction between actions we choose to undertake 
and those that are forced upon us. Since our criminal law either presupposes free will, 
see BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *27–28 (“[P]unishments are . . . only inflicted for the 
abuse of that free will, which God has given to man . . . .”); State v. Jones, 577 P.2d 
357, 361 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978), or is committed to bracketing the question, see, e.g., 
Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1091, 1144–45 
(1985); Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Responsibility and the Disappearing Person, 28 
 Voluntarism rules out clear-cut cases of compulsion—the gun-to-
your-head type case, for example. But it does not necessarily rule out 
relationship-based cases (where one member of an intimate or 
employment relationship is blamed, and perhaps also punished, for the 
wrong of another). Many of these relationships are entered into 
voluntarily.52 Voluntarism, if it is to be compelling, has to allow that we 
are responsible not only for the immediate consequences of our decisions 
but also for some of their downstream consequences too. The question 
then becomes whether the consequences—again, the wrongs committed 
by one with whom one has chosen to stand in a particular relationship—
are so far downstream as to escape the voluntarist’s sense of the 
appropriate scope of our agency. I argue in Part IV that they are not. 
 
B. Status 
 
Perhaps the problem with relationship-based culpability is not so 
much that it is unavoidable but that it punishes on the basis of status, 
rather than conduct, and thereby runs afoul of settled constitutional 
doctrine.53 But the reasons for rejecting status crimes do not impugn the 																																																																																																																																							
CARDOZO L. REV. 2545 (2007), I do not pursue this aspect of the metaphysics of agency 
here.  
52 This is the justification Markel, Collins, and Leib offer for parental responsibility 
laws. DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES 85–96 (2009). For the claim 
that this view fails to take account of background inequalities that can undermine the 
voluntary assumption of parental duties, see Naomi Cahn, Protect and Preserve?, 13 
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 127, 129–30 (2010). 
The relationships I have in mind—that of a parent to her child, or a military 
commander or executive to her subordinates—are all normally entered into voluntarily. 
I note however that we come to owe obligations even in virtue of relationships we enter 
non-voluntarily. Filial obligations are paradigmatic here. See, e.g., Samuel Scheffler, 
Relationships and Responsibility, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 189, 191–92 (1997). I allow 
that there may be cases where children should take on guilt for their parents’ 
transgressions, but I do not pursue that line of thought here.   
53 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); cf. United States v. Scales, 367 
U.S. 203, 224–25 (1961) (“In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the 
imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to 
the relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity . . . , that 
relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in 
order to withstand attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). But 
cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968) (holding that the states may punish acts 
that are attendant on status such as the state may punish sleeping in public places, even 
if it may not punish homelessness); Herbert Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal 
Responsibility, 84 YALE L.J. 413, 417 (1975) (“Certainly [Robinson] cannot be read to 
do away with all crimes of status. These have a long history in the common law and in 
statutory law; they have not been fundamentally challenged by the Court.”). See 
generally Edward J. Walters, No Way Out: Eighth Amendment Protection for Do-or-
Die Acts of the Homeless, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1619, 1620 (1995) (discussing the plight 
cases discussed here for two reasons. First, part of the opposition to 
status crimes is just a species of voluntarism. The basic idea is that a 
status is something over which one has no control and no one should be 
found guilty on the basis of characteristics over which they have no 
control.54 In response, we should note that the voluntarist worry does not 
necessarily obtain: we have seen that voluntarism does not necessarily 
rule out relationship-based culpability.55 
Second, in the cases to be considered here, warranted blame follows 
not from the status of being in a particular relationship as from the norms 
governing the relationship in question. Thus, for example, the parents 
who should take themselves to be blameworthy for their children’s 
crimes owe this obligation because of their role and not their status; the 
obligation would not obtain if, say, the individual in question were a 
biological parent who had given the child-turned-criminal up for 
adoption many years before. And there is nothing mysterious, let alone 
nefarious, about legally enforceable role-based obligations—think here 
of the obligations parents bear to take adequate care of their minor 
children, breach of which is in some places criminal.56 																																																																																																																																							
of the homeless in the face of laws that require them to “follow the law and die, or stay 
alive and risk arrest” and proposing “that courts must invalidate statues that offer 
people no lawful choice but death.” (emphasis omitted)). 
54 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of 
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1242 (1996) 
(noting the argument that status-based crimes are unfair because “having a condition 
one cannot alter should not by itself make one guilty of a crime”). Closely related to the 
notion that status crimes are in tension with voluntarism is the claim that status crimes 
run afoul of the act requirement.  See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Lifting the Cloak: 
Preventive Detention as Punishment, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1173, 1184 (2011) (noting 
that commentators and jurists decry status crimes because they violate “the supposed 
‘act requirement’ of criminal law”); Yaffe, supra note 43, at 174–75 (decrying the 
crime of appearing drunk in public because it would punish status and not an act); cf. 
Ian P. Farrell & Justin F. Marceau, Taking Voluntariness Seriously, 54 B.C. L. REV. 
1545, 1607 (2013) (noting that there are two problems with status crimes: (1) they 
eschew the act requirement, and (2) they assign criminal liability for a status the 
defendant bears involuntarily). But cf. Louis Henkin, Foreword, On Drawing Lines, 82 
HARV. L. REV. 63, 69 (1968) (challenging the supposed distinction between status and 
act). 
55 See supra text accompanying note 51 (noting that we enter into some relationships 
voluntarily). 
56 See, e.g., Child Neglect & Abandonment State Statutes, NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 
(Mar. 13, 2007), 
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/ncpca_statute_child_neglect_abandonment_3_07.pdf. So-
called parental responsibility laws are, however, controversial. See, e.g., Jennifer M. 
Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting Negligent Parents 
(Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies Paper No. 05-08, 2005), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=673451 (discussing cases where parents are prosecuted for 
negligent homicide where they leave their children in hot, parked cars and the children 
die as a result). I discuss parental responsibility laws infra Section IV.B. 
Of course, nothing so far entails that the parenting role does include 
an obligation to take responsibility for the crimes of one’s child. But if 
that obligation does not obtain it will not be because no one should be 
held responsible on the mere basis of status. 
  
C. Taint 
 
Group membership is one kind of status that commentators and 
courts have found particularly dubious as a ground of culpability. The 
idea here is that one group member’s crime should not taint the other 
members unless57 (or perhaps even if)58 there is reason to believe that the 
group as a whole authorized or ratified or at the very least tolerated the 
crime in question. In the absence of these elements, we have nothing but 
guilt by association, which commentators decry as an unworthy relic of 
the Ancients,59 one that is too primitive for enlightened folk like us.60 
Some of this is right, and some of it overblown. To be sure, blaming 
and perhaps also punishing one person for another’s crime simply 
because the two share membership in the same group is a grave injustice, 
rightly condemned as invidious discrimination (racism, sexism, etc.) 
where the group is identity-based, especially where the identifying 
characteristic is ascriptive.61 Mere membership in a group should not 																																																								
57 See, e.g., LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS 3–4 (1987); cf. JANNA 
THOMPSON, TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PAST: REPARATIONS AND HISTORICAL 
INJUSTICE 6 (2002) (justifying imposing national treaty obligations, or reparations for 
their breach, on the current generation even though the treaty was entered into by an 
earlier generation because the individual signatories to the treaty acted on behalf of the 
nation, which ratified the treaty and continues to exist to this day). 
58 See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J. PHIL. 674, 686 (1968) 
(arguing that those who opposed the group wrong should not bear responsibility or 
liability for it); Howard McGary, Morality and Collective Liability, 20 J. VALUE 
INQUIRY 157, 157 (1986) (same); Michele Moody-Adams, Culture, Responsibility and 
Affected Ignorance, 104 ETHICS 291 (1994) (same). 
59 See, e.g., Statute of Winchester 1285, 13 Edw. 1 c. 2 (containing a provision for 
frankpledge, whereby groups of 100 men would be answerable for the crime of any of 
them); cf. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1193, 1203–04 (1985) (describing an analogous Ancient practice involving 
collective liability for tort damages). See generally George P. Fletcher, The Storrs 
Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1499, 1509, 1566 (2002) (describing the Ancients’ attachment to collective 
responsibility); M. Stuart Madden, Paths of Western Law After Justinian, 22 WIDENER 
L.J. 757, 772 (2013) (“In the customary law of Germanic tribes, the victim's kinship 
group would be permitted to wreak retribution upon the slayer himself or his family.”); 
Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Punishing the Innocent Along with the Guilty: 
The Economics of Individual Versus Group Punishment, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 81, 84 
(2007) (“One of the defining characteristics of primitive law enforcement is its reliance 
on collective or group responsibility . . . .”). 
60 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 17 (railing against frankpledge). 
61 Cf. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
entail that members share responsibility for one another’s transgressions. 
But membership in some groups does license our transmitting blame 
from some members to others, independent of the latter’s participation in 
the transgression. In particular, membership in some groups comes with 
expectations that the member will shoulder blame for other members’ 
wrongs. This is common knowledge among members and outsiders, and 
it is not the product of a “barbaric”62 mentality but instead a valuable 
element constituting group bonds. I elaborate on the grounds for the 
transmission of responsibility among group members in the next Part, 
but we can already see that the idea is commonplace and not undue if we 
consider the response citizens owe when their nation-state has 
transgressed. In those cases, it will be appropriate for the nation-state to 
apologize and offer repair,63 and for its members to display contrition.64 
This is so not only when large swaths of the citizenry participated in or 
supported the transgression at the time of its occurrence. It is also true 
where many opposed the transgression as it occurred, and as forcefully 
as they could.65 These people owe an apology and their share of the 
appropriate restitution not because they happen to be the compatriots of 
others who participated in the transgression but because the transgression 
is their nation-state’s, and so it belongs to the wrongdoers as well as the 
would-be dissidents. There are then cases where some members’ 																																																																																																																																							
War, art. 33, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (“No protected person may be punished for 
an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all 
measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.”).  
62 Contra H.D. Lewis, The Non-Moral Notion of Collective Responsibility, in 
INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: MASSACRE AT MY LAI 119, 121 (Peter 
A. French ed., 1972); see NICK SMITH, I WAS WRONG: THE MEANINGS OF APOLOGIES 
188 (2008) (referring to this practice as “tribal”). 
63 See generally Richard M. Buxbaum, A Legal History of International Reparations, 
23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 314, 316–19 (2005) (discussing World War II reparations and 
the rise of an offending state’s moral responsibility to harmed states).   
64 See, e.g., Brian Weiner, National Apologies: Extraordinary Politics Within Ordinary 
Times 1 (Oct. 27–29, 2005) (unpublished manuscript presented at Repairing the Past: 
Confronting the Legacies of Slavery, Genocide, & Caste, Yale University), 
http://glc.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/justice/weiner.pdf (recognizing the distinction 
between apologies and contrition and analyzing the modern trend of nation state 
apologies as compared to the traditionally private realm of apologies). 
65 For example, some opponents of George W. Bush voted against him in the 2004 
election, and yet posted photos of themselves holding signs saying, “I’m sorry,” after he 
won. See Gallery, SORRY EVERYBODY, 
http://www.sorryeverybody.com/index_old.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). The 
phenomenon of apologizing for a wrong in which one did not participate arises for 
corporations too. Consider, for example, Wachovia Bank’s apology to “all Americans, 
and especially to African-Americans and people of African descent,” issued after 
Wachovia learned that its predecessor owned slaves and accepted slaves as collateral. 
Associated Press, Wachovia Apologizes to Black Americans, NBC NEWS (June 2, 2005) 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/8076165/ns/business-us_business/t/wachovia-apologizes-
black-americans/#.WCUoGeErKRs. 
transgression subjects others to blame but the transmission of 
responsibility is not illicit.  
 
D. A Natural History of the Fault Principle 
 
If none of the proffered objections to deviations from the fault 
principle rule out the kind of shared blame at issue here, why then has 
the fault principle so completely held us in its sway? Given my 
skepticism, I am not in a position to defend the claim that fault is 
necessary for warranted blame and punishment. But I will venture to 
offer some quick thoughts about why we might have come to believe that 
one is blameworthy only where one is at fault. First, there is something 
doubtlessly true about the fault principle—namely, that fault is a 
sufficient condition for one to warrant blame.66 Second, faulty wrongs 
have a special sting, and so a special salience.67 This is just the thought 
underpinning Justice Holmes’s famous edict that “even a dog 
distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.”68 Further, 
blame and sanction have regulative consequences: they aim—
successfully for the most part—to deter the blamed party from repeating 
the conduct prompting our censure.69 We are, then, likely most primed to 
activate blame’s deterrent potential where the wrong is one that the agent 																																																								
66 This describes the situation of many of those who have participated in the “I’m 
Sorry” campaign. See Gallery, supra note 65. It is also very nearly the case anytime 
contemporary citizens are held responsible for a historic injustice. See Amy J. 
Sepinwall, Responsibility for Historical Injustices: Reconceiving the Case for 
Reparations, 22 J.L. & POL. 183 (2006). 
67 For example, on a Strawsonian conception—so called because of Peter Strawson’s 
seminal account)—moral responsibility is at least partly constituted by the reactive 
attitudes, which are responsive to treatment that manifests “ill will or indifferent 
disregard.” Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 45, 57 (John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds., 1993). In other 
words, our moral emotional reactions are keyed to instances of wrongdoing. 
68 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009) 
(1881). While Holmes had in mind intentional wrongs, it is clear that there are other 
guilty mental states—recklessness and gross negligence, for example—even if these 
mark out crimes of less “serious culpability.” See Michael S. Moore, Intention, 
Responsibility, and the Challenges of Recent Neuroscience 1 (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.jura.uni-
freiburg.de/institute/rphil/stawi/de/downloads/Intention,_Responsibility,_and_the_Chal
lenges_of_Recent_Neuroscience.pdf. For the view that negligent harm is just as 
culpable as intentional harm, see Seana Shiffrin, The Moral Neglect of Negligence, in 
OXFORD STUDIES IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, & Steve 
Wall, eds., forthcoming). 
69 Cf. HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 89, 106–07 (1976) (identifying the 
pain of guilt as part of its function); JOSEPH BUTLER, Sermon VIII: Upon Resentment, in 
FIFTEEN SERMONS 92, 100 (Ibis Publ’g 1987) (1860) (arguing that, where virtue fails, 
individuals may nonetheless be deterred from pursuing wrongdoing by the anticipated 
unpleasantness of the resentment their wrongdoing would elicit). 
can avoid in the future. But faultless wrongs are just those wrongs that 
the agent cannot reasonably avoid. So, rebuking faultless wrongs seems 
not to serve any deterrent ends. Finally, it may well be that not only our 
most painful but also our most common experiences of blame arise 
where the blamed party is at fault.70 As such, fault is a familiar feature of 
blame for us.  
All of this suggests that our experience of blame does typically and 
prominently involve fault and so we might naturally have come to take 
fault to be a prerequisite for blame.71 The story one might tell about the 
relationship between blame and fault is then of the Humean fallacy 
genre.72 On Hume’s account, we believe that A causes B (e.g., dark 
clouds cause rain) but the belief is unwarranted. The only thing we really 
know is that B generally occurs soon after A. But nature is not always 
uniform; for all we know, the next time B occurs, A may not have 
preceded it. We have no way of proving that A is a necessary cause of B, 
and so no reason to think that we cannot have B without A.  
Applying the argument to the fault principle: we see that fault 
commonly attends blame. As a result, we have come to believe—
mistakenly—that fault is necessary for warranted blame. We cannot 
prove that fault is necessary for blame, and so we in fact have no reason 
to think that we cannot have blame without fault. The fault principle is 
then the result of our having come to mistake common associations with 
necessary connections.73 What we need to upend the story that links fault 
and blame by necessity is a counter-narrative—or, as here, a series of 
stories (real and fiction) involving warranted blame without fault. 
 																																																								
70 See Kutz, supra note 36, at 300. 
71 Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 1283–84 (offering an evolutionary account of 
retribution and discussing the historical underpinnings for why punishment should be 
limited to the severity of the transgression); Herbert Morris, Nonmoral Guilt, in 
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 220, 221–22 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (noting that the view that 
guilt is appropriate only if one is at fault provides a “‘hegemony’ of moral guilt over the 
whole sphere of guilt”); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special 
Reference to Law, 23 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43–44 (1980) (explaining the role of retribution 
in primitive societies along economic lines). 
72 See DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND 
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 76–77 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch, 
eds., rev. 3d ed. 1975). 
73 The insight is not unlike one that Bernard Williams proffered. See WILLIAMS, supra 
note 39, at 29–30. Williams noted that much standard moral and criminal theory takes 
the case of fault to be central, and the case of responsibility without fault to be 
peripheral, and so in need of special explanation. See id. But Williams argued that 
things are just the other way around; responsibility just in virtue of what one has done, 
or what one has brought about, and independent of fault, is primary, and fault just takes 
us from the primary, foundational case to a special class of cases in which one’s 
responsibility is heightened. See id. 
III. BLAME WITHOUT FAULT: SOME PRELIMINARIES 
 
To begin, it will be helpful to say more about the function of blame 
and blaming, and what the relationship between a person’s accepting 
blame and our blaming her is.  
 
A. The Function of Blame 
 
Typically, theorists argue that blame serves one or more of the 
following three functions: Blame (1) registers a demerit in one’s moral 
“ledger”;74 (2) causes the victim to experience the good of having her 
injury recognized,75 and her anger expiated in the act of blaming (or in 
witnessing others blame on her behalf);76 and (3) provides occasion for 
the wider community to enforce or affirm certain norms and values.77  
To elaborate: the ledger view, as it is typically expressed, sees in 
blame the formation of a judgment that the blamed party has done 
something morally wrong and a resulting assessment (or re-assessment) 
of the agent’s character as having some defect.78 Blame could arise in 
virtue of one’s relationships on the thought that one had poorly chosen 
one’s intimates. But one need not have been at fault in choosing one’s 
intimates to bear blame here. In the latter kind of case, the demerit or 
negative assessment goes not to one’s character but to one’s person. The 
thought is not that one ought to work to have more moral virtue but 																																																								
74 See generally JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND 
CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 8 n.12 (1998) (surveying different 
“ledger” views).  
75 See, e.g., Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 
125–26 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988) (explaining that punishment is 
a way of reaffirming the victim’s worth).  
76 See, e.g., Susan Wolf, Blame, Italian Style, in REASONS AND RECOGNITION: ESSAYS 
ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF T.M. SCANLON 332, 335–43 (R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar & 
Samuel Freeman eds., 2011).  
77 This is a kind of Durkheimian insight, see EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF 
LABOUR IN SOCIETY (60–64) (W.D. Halls transl., Macmillan Press 1984) (1893); David 
Garland, Sociological Perspectives on Punishment, 14 CRIME & JUST. 115, 123 (1991) 
(describing the Durkheimian take on punishment), applied not to the institution of 
punishment but to the social function of blaming. 
78 See, e.g., FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 74, at 8 n.12 (quoting Gary Watson’s 
reconstruction of a ledger view to this effect). The ledger view of blame can come off 
as petty, making it sound as if we all carry around moral report cards, scrutinize one 
another’s behavior, and keep fastidious track of how each of us scores. But I think one 
can adopt a ledger view without committing oneself to this petty conception. The view 
Watson describes, for example, which conceives of the “demerit” as a shorthand for a 
judgment about a character defect, does not in itself strike me as a petty way of relating 
to people. Instead, pettiness arises only if we are overly zealous or overly exacting in 
evaluating others’ conduct. But those tendencies might arise whether we understand the 
function of blame on the ledger view or instead on some other view. 
instead that one is marked by one’s relationships—marked in a way that 
is meaningful and made appropriate by the meaning and value in those 
relationships. All of that should become clearer in what follows. 
While the “demerit” component describes blame’s effect on the 
blamed party, the second and third functions of blame describe the role 
blame plays for the victim of the wrong, and sometimes for bystanders 
too. Blame’s role in recognizing the victim’s injury foregrounds blame’s 
therapeutic or restorative function.79 As we will see in the cases that 
follow, tragedies can leave their victims, or their victims’ loved ones, 
with a surfeit of anguish. Cosmic tragedies—those for which no one is to 
blame—may be the worst of all because there is no outlet in anger for the 
pain they cause. Where we can find a target of blame, then, our blaming 
him or her provides us with a means for discharging some of that pain. 
To be sure, blame’s therapeutic value must be weighed carefully against 
the pain that blame inflicts.80 Precisely because it involves a transfer of 
pain from victim to the target of blame, we should not undertake this 
transfer unless the target of blame deserves it. But, again, I leave open 
for now the question of whether the target of blame can deserve it only if 
she is at fault. And so long as she does deserve it, blame’s therapeutic 
function gives us a reason to think blame appropriate—again, not a 
decisive one, but not an inconsiderable one either. 
 Blame also offers us an opportunity to enforce norms or obligations 
that flow from certain relationships, which is what (3) denotes. As we 
shall see in Part IV, when one party to a relationship takes on blame for 
the wrong of the other party, the first expresses her recognition that her 
agency is bound up with the wrongdoer’s. Where these relationships are 
good in and of themselves, and where intertwining of agency is partly 
constitutive of the relationship, we have reason to value this intertwining, 
and the taking on of blame that it mandates. We preserve and promote 
these relationships by affirming the taking on of blame; or, where a 
person has not taken on blame when she should, we enforce norms that 
make these relationships valuable by imposing upon her the blame she 
should have assumed herself, by blaming her. 
Given these multiple functions, the conception of blame at issue here 
is clearly a pluralist one,81 pulling together several understandings of 
blame’s function that often appear separately.82 I think this is right but, 																																																								
79 See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Restorative Punishment and Punitive Restoration, in 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE LAW 82, 87–89 (Lode Walgrave ed., 2002). 
80 Cf. D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini, The Nature and Ethics of Blame, 7 
PHIL. COMPASS 197, 198 (2012) (evaluating the possibility that the function of blame is 
in part punitive). 
81 Cf. FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 73, at 8 n.12 (noting that one could hold both a 
ledger view and a Strawsonian view, as a result of which one would conceive of 
responsibility assignments as both judgments and reactive attitudes). 
82  I do not pretend that the three elements I adduce constitute an exhaustive list of 
for strategic reasons, it is also important to operate with this pluralist 
conception. After all, it would be far easier to argue that one may be 
blamed without fault if I had instead adopted an anemic conception of 
what it meant to blame someone—if blaming someone wasn’t something 
that one had multiple reasons to want to avoid. To avoid being charged 
with having stacked the deck unduly in my favor, then, I operate with 
this fuller conception here.  
With that said, blame need not fulfill each of the three functions on 
every occasion when it is appropriate. Of particular relevance here, cases 
of faultless blame likely won’t function as an outlet for anger so much as 
an opportunity to affirm certain ways of relating to one another. Anger is 
occasioned by conduct that reflects the agent’s ill will or disregard of 
others83—anger, in other words, might be the unique or at least the 
special province of faulty conduct. But a person might have reason to 
take herself to be blameworthy even if she has not acted with disregard 
toward others. And where she does have such reason, others might have 
reason to take her to be blameworthy too, because taking on blame is 
what her relationship to the victim or the wrongdoer requires, and we 
affirm the obligation and so the relationship itself when we endorse her 
blaming herself, as we can do by blaming her too.  
 
B. Accepting Blame and Blaming 
 
The account to be advanced is normative: it privileges the 
perspective that the agent should adopt in determining whether she 
should take herself to be blameworthy. Here, I seek to describe (1) why 
we should privilege the perspective the agent should adopt, rather than 
the one she does adopt; (2) the difference between “accepting blame” 
and “taking oneself to be blameworthy,” and (3) when and why a 
person’s taking herself to be blameworthy makes it the case that others 
have license to blame her.  
 
1. The Ideal Agent’s Perspective 
 
In the following cases, I will be relying on the norms and obligations 
that obtain within the relationships in question. These norms and 
obligations, we shall see, sometimes make it the case that one should 																																																																																																																																							
blame’s functions. Tim Scanlon, for example, conceives of blaming as a way of 
registering that someone has displayed attitudes that impair your relationship with her, 
and make it appropriate for you to revise your relationship with her. T.M. SCANLON, 
MORAL DIMENSIONS 157 (2008). I do not focus on this function of blame since I think 
it best as an account of blame between intimates or, more tenuously, members of a 
tight-knit community, but poorly suited to tracking the kind of blame that underpins 
criminal law. 
83 See, e.g., Strawson, supra note 67, at 57. 
judge herself to be blameworthy even if one’s conduct would not be 
deemed faulty under the fault principle. Given that it is norms and 
obligations that underpin the determination that one should (or should 
not) judge herself to be blameworthy, we need not take the agent’s self-
assessment as authoritative. Instead we may judge whether an agent’s 
belief about her blameworthiness is correct, and we would do so in light 
of various standards. The fault principle is one such standard but not the 
only one. Other standards flow, we shall see, from the norms and 
obligations that obtain in the relationship under consideration. 
 
2. Accepting Blame Versus Taking Oneself to Be Blameworthy 
 
It will be important to distinguish between (1) cases in which 
someone accedes to act as if she is to blame, all the while hewing 
privately to the belief that she does not deserve blame; and (2) cases in 
which someone agrees to take herself to warrant blame. I refer to the 
former as accepting blame and to the latter as taking oneself to be 
blameworthy. Both entail a willingness to accept the material 
consequences of being blameworthy—a strike in one’s moral ledger, 
words of reproach from others, perhaps other social sanctions still, etc. 
But only (2), taking oneself to be blameworthy, mandates a change in 
one’s beliefs about whether one deserves blame.84 Thus, one who merely 
accepts blame does not recognize the legitimacy of the victim’s 
grievance, or the community’s indignation, and so there can be no real 
remorse on her part. She offers herself up as a target of anger as an act of 
kindness, but not as an act of contrition. On the other hand, when a 
person takes himself to be blameworthy, he incurs an obligation to 
recognize that he deserves to be treated as a target of anger, and this 
recognition mandates that he come to feel contrite too. In some cases, 
when a person takes himself to be blameworthy, he is then required to 
come to believe, if he does not already believe, that he is at fault.85 But 
not all cases in which one ought to take oneself to be blameworthy are 
like this, we shall see.86 																																																								
84 For a third-personal analog to the distinction I articulate between acting as if one is to 
blame and taking oneself to be blameworthy, see David Miller, Holding Nations 
Responsible, 114 ETHICS 240, 244–46 (2004) (describing “outcome responsibility”, 
which arises where an individual deserves to incur the material consequences of her 
acts, but not moral sanction); Richard Vernon, Punishing Collectives: States or 
Nations?, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR COLLECTIVE WRONGDOING 287, 301–02 (Tracy 
Isaacs & Richard Vernon eds., 2011) (analyzing the appropriateness of exacting 
punishment on individuals for the political actions of a nation or state). 
85 This dynamic is illustrated in the example of Sue Klebold, mother of one of the 
Columbine killers. See infra Section IV.B. 
86 See infra Section IV.C (discussing the grounds upon which an executive who is 
innocent of his corporation’s crime ought nonetheless to take himself to be 
blameworthy for it). 
 
3. Taking Oneself to Be Blameworthy and Blaming 
 
Suppose that a person does have an obligation to take herself to be 
blameworthy. Why would this entail that others are permitted to blame 
her?  
Sometimes the act or outcome rendering someone blameworthy is 
one about which we, the public, may complain, even if we are not its 
most immediate victims. We can see this when we consider our response 
to malum in se wrongs, which we view as wrongs committed against all 
persons, and not just their victims.87 So if an individual A recognizes that 
she has offended against us, and that she must take herself to be 
blameworthy for her offense, then she must recognize that we have 
license to blame her. What it is for her to take herself to be blameworthy 
is for her to hold herself out as a target of reproach, and invite at least 
some others—in particular, those who are licensed to complain—to join 
her in finding her blameworthy and treating her as such. All else being 
equal, we do her no wrong in taking up the invitation, though I shall 
argue that sometimes other considerations make it the case that we 
should decline it.88 
But if the act or outcome for which A takes herself to be 
blameworthy is not one that concerns us, then bystanders have no license 
to blame her.89 The situation is no different from the garden-variety case 
where one is at fault for having wronged an intimate and the wrong in 
question is one we deem to be a private matter. In that case, it is 
improper for impartial third parties to blame. But the fault principle plays 
no role in our determination that third parties should refrain from 
blaming. Instead it is norms of privacy that do so. These same norms 																																																								
87 Cf. R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME 141–42 (2007) (“A public wrong is . . . a 
wrong against the polity as a whole, not just against the individual victim: given our 
identification with the victim as a fellow citizen, and our shared commitment to the 
values that the [offender] violates, we must see the victim’s wrong as also being our 
wrong.”); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS IN CRIMINAL LAW 77 (1998) 
(“Crimes are public wrongs, for in addition to the particular victim the public as a 
whole is injured in its sense of security and well-being.”); JOSHUA DRESSLER, 
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 121 (7th ed. 2015) (“Crimes are public wrongs. The 
implication of a guilty verdict is that the convicted party wronged the community as a 
whole.”).  
88 See infra Sections IV.A.3, IV.B. 
89 See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 87, at 141–42; Lindsay Farmer, Criminal Law As an 
Institution: Rethinking Theoretical Approaches to Criminalization, in 
CRIMINALIZATION: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 80, 85 (R.A. Duff 
et al. eds., 2014); Cf. Leo Katz, The Prerequisites of Responsibility: Comments on 
Antony Duff, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 468–69 (2005) (affirming Duff’s position that 
the criminal law should concern itself only with public wrongs, but doubting that that 
position can illuminate the question of what it would take to count as responsible). 
should militate against blaming where the obligation to take oneself to be 
blameworthy is not fault-based, but the underlying grievance is also a 
private matter. We will see this norm against intervention played out in 
what follows. 
 
IV. CASES OF FAULTLESS BLAME 
   
I turn now to a series of cases aimed at illustrating that blame can be 
warranted solely in light of the functions of blame adduced in Part II, and 
even in cases where the target of blame is not at fault. Together, the 
cases offer a critical phenomenology of blame: I seek to describe the 
emotional reactions likely to be experienced in each of the situations and 
to comment on whether they are fitting (are they prompted by an 
accurate evaluation of their object?), as well as whether they ought to be 
endorsed (would it be good all things considered to experience them?). I 
begin with relationships between friends and family, because these are 
familiar and because taking on blame within these relationships need not, 
and typically does not, eventuate in any kind of social or institutional 
response (the state will not heap punishment upon the parent who takes 
himself to be blameworthy for an accident of his child of which the 
parent is in fact innocent). Without the worry that admitting 
blameworthiness will render us liable to social sanction or state 
punishment, we might well be more inclined to take on blame. So, the 
intimate context is one where we will most readily see blame and fault 
coming apart.90 
I then move from the family context to the corporate context, and 
consider cases where a CEO should take himself to be blameworthy for a 
crime of his corporation for which he is not at fault.91 In the last Section 																																																								
90 I note also that the history of vicarious liability begins with the family context, as 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. argued in his detailed study of the doctrine. See Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345, 364 (1891); id. at 353 (“The wife 
was said to be in the nature of a servant, and husband and wife were only one person in 
law.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 355–56 (noting that “in some counties a man [was] held 
to answer for the members of his family.”). 
91 A word about gendered pronouns: Except where the context demands otherwise, I 
use female pronouns for the parent protagonist and male pronouns for the CEO. The 
choice is deliberate: When it comes to mass shootings—the crime at issue in the 
parental context—virtually all offenders are male. See, e.g., Jeffrey Kluger, Why Mass 
Killers Are Always Male, TIME (May 25, 2014), http://time.com/114128/elliott-rodgers-
ucsb-santa-barbara-shooter/ (reporting that males make up over 98% of mass killers). 
Since the child is male, I contemplate a female parent, just to make it easier for the 
reader to discern whether I am referring to parent or child. Gender disparity is almost 
equally pronounced when it comes to corporate executive positions: Among the 
Fortune 500, only 14.6% of executives are female, and females comprise only 4.6% of 
CEOs. See Judith Warner, Fact Sheet: The Women’s Leadership Gap, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (Mar. 7, 2014), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/report/2014/03/07/85457/fact-sheet-
of this Part, I consider possible objections. The work of this Part 
concerns only the circumstances grounding blame; I defer to the next 
Part the criminal law implications of the conclusions reached here. 
 
A. Disentangling Blame and Fault in Intimate Contexts: A Tragic 
Accident 
  
This Section reaches conclusions that the adherent of the fault 
principle should find surprising: First, the standards governing what 
counts as faulty conduct vary according to the perspective from which 
one judges: Thus, parents, for example, should judge themselves more 
harshly than outsiders judge them. That is not the same as saying that 
parents should hold themselves to higher standards when their conduct 
affects their children. Both the adherent of the fault principle and I can 
allow that parents owe their children a heightened standard of care. But 
here is where we diverge: The adherent of the fault principle will think 
that the amount of blame someone deserves varies only according to the 
magnitude or severity of one’s fault. By contrast, I aim to show that the 
amount of deserved blame can also turn on the nature of the relationship 
between the wrongdoer and the victim. Thus, a parent can correctly take 
herself to be more blameworthy when her wrong results in an injury to 
her child rather than a stranger even if she is, and she knows that she is, 
equally at fault with respect to each of them. Further, I seek to establish 
that one can be blameworthy even if one is not at fault at all, and solely 
by virtue of one’s having caused harm to a loved one. The first two sub-
sections here contain illustrations of these phenomena. 
Second, and more surprising, where both the parent’s and our 
conclusions about warranted blame diverge, but both are correct from the 
perspective from which these conclusions are formed, we should 
sometimes adopt the parent’s conclusion. Whether we should replace our 
conclusion with the parent’s will depend, on the one hand, on whether 
blaming her will satisfy the functions of blame adduced above and, on 
the other hand, on whether there are countervailing reasons that militate 
against our blaming (e.g., that she is grieving and her grief is suffering 
enough). These considerations are aired in sub-section 3, below. 
  
1. Lots of Blame with Only Minor Fault 
 
I begin here by contemplating a case in which a child is killed in a 
car accident for which no one is at fault and yet some of the individuals 
involved take themselves to be blameworthy—as they should, we will 
see. Bernard Williams offers a famous example involving something like 																																																																																																																																							
the-womens-leadership-gap/.  I use male pronouns to refer to the CEO in light of this 
(lamentable) reality.  
faultless self-blame. He describes a lorry driver who, although driving 
impeccably, kills a young child who has darted unexpectedly into the 
road.92 Williams contends that the driver will react differently to the 
death than would a mere bystander, and with good reason, since the 
driver’s agency has been implicated in the death in a way that the 
bystander’s has not. Who we are, Williams says, depends on what we 
have done and what consequences our actions bring about, and this is so 
for faulty and faultless actions alike.93 Thus the driver’s biography has 
been punctuated by this tragic event—it figures in the narrative of his life 
in a way different from the way it will figure in the life of a mere 
bystander to the event. That we have reason to feel ourselves more 
implicated where some harm arose as a result of our actions, faultless 
though they may be, is for Williams not merely understandable but the 
mark of a decent character.94 Thus, he contends that “some doubt would 
be felt about a driver who too blandly or readily moved to th[e] position” 
of a mere spectator after being reminded that the accident was not his 
fault.95 
There is much puzzlement over what features of the driver’s situation 
give rise, or should give rise, to his distinctive experience.96 If what the 
driver regrets is the fact of his own involvement, then there seems little 
reason to affirm his reaction; after all, the tragedy in the event 
overwhelmingly resides in the child’s death, and not in the driver’s now-
altered biography. On this understanding, then, the driver seems to 
exhibit an unseemly narcissism. But what else about the driver’s 
involvement would give him reason to experience the tragedy differently 
from a bystander? The details of the lorry driver case are quite sparse, so 
it is hard to know just what beliefs underpin the driver’s reaction and so 
just what shape the driver’s emotions take.97 But we can make progress 																																																								
92 See WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 27–30.  
93 Id. at 29–30. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 28. See also Wolf, supra note 5 at 12 (explaining why it would be untoward for 
the lorry driver to feel no differently from the spectator thus: “What is problematic is 
[the lorry driver’s] failure to take the consequences of his faultiness to have 
consequences for him, to be a significant part of his personal history, in a way in which 
witnessing, much less reading about an accident would not be.”). 
96 For a recent example, see R. JAY WALLACE, THE VIEW FROM HERE: ON 
AFFIRMATION, ATTACHMENT, AND THE LIMITS OF REGRET 32–45 (2013); cf. David 
Sussman, Is Agent-Regret Rational? (2013) (unpublished manuscript presented at 47th 
Chapel Hill Colloquium in Philosophy, University of North Carolina), 
http://philosophy.unc.edu/files/2014/07/Sussman_colloquium-.pdf (“There is, after all, 
something very paradoxical about the claim that the driver really should blame himself 
if others with exactly the same beliefs about the situation should not similarly blame or 
resent him as well.”). 
97 Julie Tannenbaum is one philosopher who aims to elucidate the appropriate grounds 
for agent-regret. See Julie Tannenbaum, Emotional Expressions of Moral Value, 132 
PHIL. STUD. 43 (2007). 
if we turn to a case that bears a great deal of similarity to that of the lorry 
driver, with one twist: The agent in question is no mere stranger to the 
child-victim; she is instead the child’s mother.  
The example comes from the Pulitzer-prize winning play, Rabbit 
Hole,98 and the central event of the play, which has taken place even 
before the play begins, involves a woman, Becca, who is in her front 
yard with her four-year-old son, Danny, when the family dog runs into 
the street. Danny follows and he is hit by a car coming down the street. 
The driver is a high school student who has just earned his license but 
there is no reason to think the driver is at fault. Danny dies and Becca is 
wracked by guilt. 
It would not be difficult to massage the elements of the plot such that 
they fit within the contours of the fault principle, and to therefore arrive 
at a conventional understanding of Becca’s guilt. Becca might believe 
that Danny was able to run off only because she let her attention lapse, 
her having done so was at least negligent, and so she rightly experiences 
guilt over his death. On the other hand, some of us might be disinclined 
to find fault even here. Full-time parenting is exhausting, unfailing rapt 
attention is too much to ask of any parent, most of us have moments 
when we are distracted, and most of us, thankfully, are never made to 
pay for these distractions in the way that Becca has been. Becca is not a 
worse parent than we are—she is not even a substandard parent on this 
way of viewing the matter. She is just the victim of bad luck. Should we 
then take her guilt to be unreasonable?  
In thinking about Becca’s guilt it will be useful to invoke a 
distinction advanced by Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, between an 
emotion’s fittingness and its all-things-considered propriety.99 For 
D’Arms and Jacobson, an emotion is fitting if “it accurately presents its 
object as having certain evaluative features.”100 To take an example of 
theirs, envy is the fitting response of an untenured professor to a 
colleague who receives tenure because envy is the emotion that “portrays 
a rival as having a desirable possession that one lacks, and it casts this 
circumstance in a specific negative light.”101 But even if envy fits, it 
might nonetheless be all-things-considered improper. If one’s newly 
tenured colleague deserves her promotion, if she has been a good friend, 
if she would experience nothing but unadulterated happiness were the 
tables turned, then one should recognize that envy, fitting as it is, is not 
the emotion one ought to experience.102  																																																								
98 DAVID LINDSAY-ABAIRE, RABBIT HOLE (2005). 
99 See Justin D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson, The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 
‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions, 61 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 65 (2000). 
100 Id. at 65. 
101 Id. at 66. 
102 Angela Smith raises a related distinction that pertains specifically to blame: She 
argues that the question of whether one is culpable is conceptually prior to the question 
Now, the claim about propriety presupposes that one’s emotions are 
appropriately subject to moral judgment. Insofar as one thinks of one’s 
emotional responses as beyond one’s control, one might think the claim 
odd, if not altogether wrong. Yet those who defend the idea that 
emotions are proper subjects of moral evaluation acknowledge that 
emotions often come upon us unbidden. They contend, however, that 
when one judges the propriety of an emotion, one seeks to evaluate not 
the emotion just as it has risen to consciousness, but instead what might 
be called one’s considered emotions: We often feel things we know we 
should not—jealousy or schadenfreude, for example. We should blame 
ourselves for having these feelings if, but only if, we allow them to take 
hold rather than trying to extinguish them.103 In this and the next sub-
section, I consider only the fittingness and propriety of the first-person 
emotion—i.e., Becca’s guilt. In Section IV.A.3, I turn to whether we, 
impartial observers of Becca’s situation, should blame Becca as she 
blames herself.  
Returning now to Becca, what might make her guilt fitting? Here is 
one explanation, but not one that ultimately works. Suppose that Becca 
agrees that she did do all she could to prevent Danny’s death. In more 
reflective moments, she acknowledges that she is without fault. But she 
nonetheless takes refuge in a kind of imagined culpability given that 
guilt can function as a diversion: Guilt sustains a sensible narrative about 
the tragedy. It allows Becca to tell a story about what made it the case 
that Danny died, and it is a story with a villain—Becca—onto whom she 
can expiate some of her anguish in the form of self-directed indignation. 
Painful as this is, it is perhaps less devastating than the brute accident, 
the cosmic injustice, that purveyor of senseless tragedy that provides no 
target for any of the agony that it inflicts.104 
Now, while this account can explain the etiology of Becca’s guilt, it 																																																																																																																																							
of whether one should be blamed, and that the latter is “sensitive to a host of 
considerations that appear to have little or nothing to do with an agent's responsibility 
or culpability for her attitudes or behavior.” Angela M. Smith, On Being Responsible 
and Holding Responsible, 11 J. ETHICS 465, 466 (2007). 
103 See, e.g., Nancy Sherman, Taking Responsibility for Our Emotions, SOC. PHIL. & 
POL’Y, July 1999, at 294. 
104 Of course, if Becca is to seek refuge in imagined fault, one might think the more 
plausible way in which this would play itself out would involve her imagining that the 
driver was at fault, rather than taking herself to be at fault. But I think this strategy less 
optimal and less faithful to what is at stake: Earlier I adduced the therapeutic power of 
expiating one’s anger. On that basis, let us assume, blaming the driver and blaming 
herself are equally effective and so equally desirable. But in blaming herself, Becca 
affirms her role as parent—after all (as I go on to argue), the normative ideal of 
parenting involves seeing oneself as more responsible for what happens to one’s child. 
Blaming the driver would not have this effect, and this effect is therapeutic in its own 
right. So, self-directed blame seems to be the more desirable strategy for coping with 
the pain of her loss. 
does not show her guilt to be fitting. On D’Arms and Jacobson’s 
account, guilt is fitting if Becca accurately sees herself as bearing blame 
for Danny’s death.105 But on the explanation just proffered, Becca does 
not accurately see herself as bearing blame; she would acknowledge, if 
pressed, that she merely imagines herself to have been at fault. She does 
not truly believe that she was.  
But there are multiple scenarios that would make Becca’s guilt 
fitting. I explore two of them here.  
 
a. Cases of uncertainty about the facts 
 
Becca’s guilt might be fitting if, from her perspective, it reasonably 
appears that she was at fault. We expect parents to go above and beyond 
the call of duty; when a child’s life is at stake, we expect parents to do 
everything in their power to prevent their child’s death. We, impassive 
observers of Becca’s case, might well be willing to grant that she did 
everything she could to prevent Danny’s death, and so think her entirely 
free of omission liability. But she is beset by the crushing doubt that she 
could have done still more—reacted sooner, run faster, reached Danny in 
time—and that her failure to have done more constitutes her fault. 
Insofar as Becca truly and not unreasonably believes that she is at fault 
(as opposed to her indulging a comforting fiction), she has reason to feel 
guilty. Her guilt is then fitting since it is responsive to her expanded but 
not irrational sense of her own agency. Becca’s guilt accurately presents 
her as having culpably caused Danny’s death—culpably because, by her 
not unreasonable lights, she did less than she could and should have to 
have prevented his death, and so she is at fault.106 
Importantly, Becca’s guilt, on this scenario, is not unreasonable 
because it does not defy the truth about whether she was at fault, even if 
we impartial observers have reason to believe that it was more likely 
than not that she was not at fault. Put differently, Becca’s judgment that 
she was at fault trades on a general causal indeterminacy, and it trades on 
that indeterminacy in just the direction it should, given her role as 																																																								
105 See D’Arms and Jacobson, supra note 99, at 69–75. 
106 D’Arms and Jacobson note that which emotions we experience can depend on 
perspective, though they accord perspective a different role: 
 
[A] fact we’ve noticed about anger: what you actually feel depends 
very strongly on where you're placed. Most of us don’t often find 
ourselves getting angry at injustices that are unrelated to our own 
concerns, even when we grant them to be worse, morally, than the 
local transgressions that sometimes so enrage us. 
 
Justin D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson, Expressivism, Morality, and the Emotions, 104 
ETHICS 739, 757 (1994).  
Danny’s parent. We are not always in a position to be clear about the 
causal facts.107 As such, there is some room to fudge the causal 
metaphysics when it comes to determining what should count as the true 
scope of a person’s causal agency. And where there is this room, moral 
values may, and indeed sometimes should, decide the issue. This is just 
the rationale for giving someone—especially someone with whom we 
are in a trusting relationship—the benefit of the doubt. When we do so, 
we do not suspend judgment. Instead, we overcome our doubts by 
deferring to their version of the facts, and endeavoring to come to 
believe it to be true. In this way, norms of loyalty or solidarity decide 
what we will take to be true.  
We can understand that someone in Becca’s position might 
overcome her doubts about her causal role in a similar way. On this 
thought, Becca’s anguishing suspicion that she might have made a 
difference would then not be a delusion born of a perverse sense of 
grandeur. Just the opposite: it would reflect a clear-eyed humility about 
our ability to make causal determinations with anywhere near complete 
certainty, and a choice to err on the more unforgiving side, the side that 
implicates rather than exculpates. Given this choice, Becca’s guilt would 
be responsive to a not inaccurate picture of the world, and so it is fitting. 
Now it is important to note that Becca’s guilt would fit the scenario 
only if there were room to question whether she could reasonably have 
done more than she did. There comes a point where it is too far-fetched 
to believe that one could have made a difference. Perhaps parents, 
contemplating their interactions with their kids, should be expansive 
when it comes to identifying just where that point is. But that does not 
mean that the boundary between the plausible and the completely 
improbable disappears.108 The account here allows for guilt in 
circumstances well beyond what the fault principle contemplates, but it 
is not completely insensitive to the bounds of causation.109   
But why should a parent be so keen to conclude that she was at fault 
and thus is worthy of blame? Or to put the question in D’Arms and 
Jacobson’s terms, is parental guilt in these cases proper? Answering that 																																																								
107 Cf. Morse, supra note 2, at 880 (“[T]he legal doctrines of causation are unlikely to 
map dependably the prelegal metaphysics of causation, that is, the universe's ontology 
of physical cause and effect.”); id. at 880–81 (“the rampant and unavoidable complexity 
and vagueness of causation doctrine . . . was created to solve legal liability problems, 
not to specify the metaphysics of actual physical causation.”); Wex S. Malone, 
Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956) (arguing that even 
determinations of but-for causation, which are supposed to turn on objective facts, 
inevitably smuggle in normative considerations).  
108 Or, if we adopt a more scalar approach, see Michael S. Moore, Causation and 
Responsibility, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, July 1999, at 1, we must recognize that at some 
point the degree of causation peters out. 
109 For other sources of non-causal guilt, see supra note 15. 
question requires that we arrive at an all-things-considered determination 
of whether it is good that a parent experience guilt, where goodness 
might be cashed out in terms of guilt’s instrumental utility, its meaning, 
its costs to the sufferer, and so on. I will not endeavor a full-blown 
account of what makes it good for one to experience some emotion 
rather than not. But I will say that I think that Becca’s guilt is good, all-
things-considered, for it is consistent with, and indeed it affirms, a 
normative ideal of parenting: At least before her child reaches the age of 
moral maturity, a parent ought to have an enlarged sense of her own 
causal agency—the responsibility of raising a vulnerable, dependent 
being should make it the case that parents think themselves capable of 
controlling more of their child’s environment than would be reasonable 
if we were assessing the extent of control one stranger ought to think he 
can exercise over the environment of another. Thus, it is not a sign of 
narcissistic dysfunction for a parent to see herself in her child’s acts 
(though it may be when a parent continues to incorporate her child’s 
agency into her own once her child reaches adulthood). It is instead the 
appropriate way to understand one’s role and place in the parent-child 
relationship. Thus, the parent ought to take on some of the agency that 
her child lacks. And the parent ought to assess her parenting in light of 
this enlarged sense of agency. Where some harm befalls her child and it 
is not unreasonable for the parent to identify some salient causal 
connection between the harm and her own action or inaction, guilt would 
seem the proper response. 
At the same time, impartial observers should see the matter 
differently. Faced with the same causal indeterminacy that Becca 
encounters, we bear obligations to be chary, not expansive, in our 
conception of the role she played in Danny’s death. It is good that each 
of us operate with a capacious sense of our own agency, but also good 
that others think us not quite so powerful. Significant freedom would be 
lost were others to take us to be responsible in all of the situations where 
we should hold ourselves responsible.110 
If that is right, then Becca can correctly judge herself to be at fault 
while we can correctly judge her not to be at fault. The interesting 
implication of this divergence, which we shall see in Section IV.A.2,111 
is that we sometimes have reason to think Becca blameworthy even 
though she is not, by our lights, at fault.  
 
b. Fault and Relationally-Informed Guilt 
 
In the scenario just described—where Becca reasonably concludes 
that she was at fault, and so experiences guilt—the fault principle is not 																																																								
110 See supra text accompanying note 93. 
111 See infra text accompanying notes 126–27. 
directly under attack. Causal indeterminacy combined with her parental 
role compels Becca to conclude that she must have been at fault. That is, 
her relationship serves to resolve the uncertainty around the causal facts, 
and it does so in light of a norm making it appropriate to conclude that 
she was at fault. But it is only in virtue of that conclusion that she takes 
herself to be guilty. So, consistent with the fault principle, fault precedes 
guilt; she is blameworthy only because she was at fault. 
 We can however begin to see the first evidence of the fissure 
between blame and fault if we compare Becca’s perspective to that of the 
lorry driver. Like Becca, the driver holds himself, and should hold 
himself, to a standard higher than that to which bystanders do and should 
hold him. Accidents seem to involve one or more counterfactuals of 
indeterminate plausibility. There is always the thought that, like in 
Becca’s case, greater attention, faster reflexes, something, might have 
allowed one to avert disaster. And why shouldn’t the driver—or Becca—
be more afflicted by this set of thoughts than the onlooker whose agency 
is not implicated in the accident?112 It is good that each of us operates 
with a heightened sense of her causal agency; after all, exercising our 
causal agency is not without risks.113 And it is also good that others 
judge us less harshly than we judge ourselves; life would be oppressive 
otherwise. By the light of his own sense of what he could and should 
have done, the lorry driver has reason to feel guilt; by the light of a more 
generous sense of what he could and should have done, onlookers have 
reason to judge him not to be at fault.  
At the same time, we might expect the magnitude of Becca’s guilt to 
be greater than that of the lorry driver. Imagine two further versions of 
the lorry driver case, each involving an equal, but small, quantum of 
negligence. In particular, suppose that the driver in question was overdue 
to have the car’s brakes checked and it was the brakes’ poor condition 
that made the car unable to stop before hitting Danny.114 Now consider 
two variants on this scenario: In the first, the car is driven by Williams’s 
driver; in the second, it is driven by Becca. Danny, Becca’s son, is the 
victim in both cases. Do Becca and the lorry driver take themselves to be 
equally blameworthy? Note that both are equally at fault: While Becca 
has reason to exercise heightened care when she interacts with her child, 
neither Becca nor the lorry driver had any reason to think that any child, 																																																								
112 David Sussman considers this possibility but he thinks it is either a species of 
garden-variety remorse or, if the driver thinks the possibility of his fault exceedingly 
remote, then the driver should accept blame, but not take himself to be blameworthy. 
See Sussman, supra note 96, at 8–10.  
113 Cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 29 (“[I]t would be an insane concept of rationality 
which insisted that . . . we might, if we conducted ourselves clear-headedly enough, 
entirely detach ourselves from the unintentional aspects of our actions . . . and yet still 
retain our identity and character as agents.”). 
114 Susan Wolf developed this example. Wolf, supra note 5, at 8. 
let alone hers, might dart out into the road. As such, she would not have 
had reason—even from her own perspective—to have hewed to 
heightened standards of care. So, she would not have reason to think that 
she was more at fault, that her performance fell shorter of the mark than 
the lorry driver’s. In other words, Becca and the lorry driver would hold 
themselves to the same standards, and take themselves to be equally 
delinquent in light of these standards.  But there is a difference in the 
way each views their role, for the delinquency is less tolerable in the 
parent-child context than in the stranger context. As such, even though 
Becca is not, and does not take herself to be, more at fault than the lorry 
driver, she has reason to view her fault as more blameworthy. 
This thought suggests a wedge between blame and fault. In 
particular, it shows that the magnitude of warranted blame can turn on 
factors additional to whether one is at fault. Again, the idea is not that 
Becca is subject to more demanding standards than the lorry driver, such 
that she misses the mark of what it would have been to act properly by a 
greater margin than he does (i.e., that she falls shorter, so to speak, than 
he does). It is instead that it is more significant when one falls short in a 
way that affects a loved one, rather than a stranger, and this is true even 
if one falls just as short in both cases. The fact that one has failed a loved 
one thus heightens the warrant for blame on its own terms. This suggests 
that the amount of blame one deserves turns in part on the extent of one’s 
fault and in part on the meaning of that fault for those whom it affects; in 
particular, the amount of blame two equally faulty actors deserve may 
well depend on whether the victim who is harmed through their faulty 
action is a stranger or a loved one, with more blame being warranted in 
the latter case. So, blame is not responsive only to fault.115 
Now, one might think that the fault principle could accommodate this 
insight. After all, adherents of the fault principle acknowledge that where 
two people are equally at fault but only one produces harm, the one who 
produces harm is to blame for more than the other.116 But that 
acknowledgment is not equivalent to saying that the one who produces 
harm is more blameworthy than the other. Instead, on the traditional 
conception, blame is calibrated solely in light of the magnitude of one’s 
fault (although of course one’s “outcome responsibility”117 will depend 
on the amount of harm one has caused). But the point here is that, given 
equal fault and equal amounts of harm caused—a child’s death, in the 
case where either Becca or the lorry driver has caused the accident—one 																																																								
115 Thomas Scanlon incorporates something like this feature in his account of blame, 
holding that a person will conceive of the meaning of a slight by his friend differently 
than an onlooker would conceive of the slight, though each would judge the slight to be 
equally wrong. Scanlon, though, has a very different view of blame from the one here. 
See SCANLON, supra note 82, at 136–37. 
116 See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 5; Feinberg, supra note 58, at 681–84.  
117 TONY HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 7 (1999). 
agent can nonetheless warrant more blame than the other, and this 
additional blame results from the relationship of the agent to the victim.  
In sum, there are two ways in which relationships inform 
assessments of blameworthiness. First, one’s relationship to one’s own 
acts matters. Thus, Becca and the lorry driver are at fault by their own 
lights, but not by ours, because they apply more demanding standards to 
their own conduct than we do and should apply to it. Second, the extent 
to which one is blameworthy depends on one’s relationship with the 
victim, and this is a ground of blame completely independent of fault. As 
such, there is some amount of blame one can deserve that has nothing to 
do with how much fault one bears. We have, then, arrived at a departure 
from the fault principle, even if only a modest one. 
 
2. Faultless Guilt 
 
Let us now return to the case as Williams had constructed it—
importantly, an accident where the lorry driver bore no fault at all, and 
where the driver knows he is without fault. And let us compare the 
faultless lorry driver to a faultless Becca, again with Danny as the victim, 
with the important element that each driver knows that he or she is 
faultless. Williams is clear that the driver’s agent-regret is fitting, but he 
would also think that guilt is not. For Williams, guilt fits only if the agent 
is at fault.118  So Williams is not one who rejects the fault principle; he is 
just one who thinks it should be supplemented by non-moral, but no less 
weighty, considerations. Williams is led to distinguish between guilt and 
agent-regret precisely because of his larger project, involving a critique 
of the “morality system.”119 I do not seek to intervene in that debate here, 
and so I am prepared to punt on the question of whether the lorry driver’s 
reaction is moral or non-moral—that is, whether we should, along with 
Williams, understand the driver’s reaction as a species of agent-regret, 
rather than guilt. 
The important claim to be defended here is that Becca’s reaction, 
even in the case where she knows she is not at fault, is a species of guilt. 
Or, more accurately, Becca’s is a case where the fittingness of guilt can 
elide considerations of fault altogether. A parent has killed her child. 
What business does she even have investigating the facts to see if she is 																																																								
118 Williams uses the term “remorse” rather than guilt, and he contrasts remorse with 
agent-regret on the ground that remorse applies only to the “voluntary.” Williams, 
supra note 39, at 30. It is reasonable to interpret Williams’s use of “voluntary” here 
such that it, and the remorse it engenders, track fault. See, e.g., Sussman, supra note 96, 
at 1 (restating Williams’s understanding remorse, regret, and agent-regret in this way: 
“Like remorse, agent-regret is only properly felt by the person who performed the bad 
act; but like mere regret, agent-regret involves no presumption of fault.”).  
119 BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 174–96 (1985); see 
also WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 20–39. 
at fault? What moral difference could it make from her perspective for 
the way she should feel about the death?  
This is not to say that Becca’s having been at fault would make no 
difference to her self-assessment. The point is rather that her attention 
would be misdirected—wrongfully—if she were to worry about her 
culpability. Her profound distress over having caused her son’s death 
should short-circuit the typical inquiry into fault that precedes one’s 
determination that one ought to experience guilt. Given her causal 
agency, and given her relationship to her victim, guilt should be her lot 
whether or not she is at fault.120  
Another way to put the point is to say that, in this case, there is no 
meaningful difference between agent-regret and guilt. For one thing, one 
certainly could not rely on phenomenology to distinguish the two 
reactions. I doubt that our emotional receptors are sensitive enough to 
register the fine-grained differences in the way that agent-regret and guilt 
will feel, especially when the reaction in question is as all-consuming as 
it will be for the decent parent. But suppose that the key distinction 
between guilt and agent-regret is that only the former is accompanied or 
underpinned by the belief that the agent was at fault. In that case, third 
parties might have a reason to characterize Becca’s felt reaction as agent-
regret, rather than guilt. But Becca is not, and should not be, in a position 
to register this distinction—again, because it is not for her to be forming 
beliefs about fault in the circumstance.121  
In the variant of the case where the lorry driver or Becca bore a small 
measure of fault for the car accident that killed Danny, I argued that 
Becca would feel more guilt than the lorry driver, not because she was 
more at fault—ex hypothese, they were equally at fault—but because the 
fault was more consequential for Becca. Perhaps the set of beliefs 
underpinning Becca’s greater guilt there will occur to some parents in a 
situation like the horrific one that Becca faced. But we are now in a 																																																								
120 Becca’s causal role is important here, in much the way that Williams describes. 
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. .”). Killing Danny is Becca’s act independent of her fault, but not independent of her 
agency. For that reason, had Becca been hypnotized and then made to drive the car, or 
had Danny been dropped by an evil villain from an overpass at just the moment when 
Becca would hit him as she was driving by, she would not have reason to think she 
killed Danny. Here, I think it would not be inappropriate for others to urge her to see 
that she was not causally responsible, and for her to take some solace in the fact that she 
was not. But that just seems to underscore the power of one’s agency in one’s sense of 
one’s responsibility. 
121 The idea might be captured in an aphorism Bernard Williams expresses in a different 
context: The thought, “I am [not] at fault for Danny’s death” is in the circumstance, and 
to use Williams’s words, “‘one thought too many.’” See Williams, supra note 39, at 18.  
position to see that that set of beliefs is unnecessary to ground Becca’s 
guilt. We need only advert to Becca’s relationship to Danny—and not to 
a consideration of whether she is at fault at all—to explain why she 
would and should be beset by a guilt significantly greater than the 
driver’s. 
This is not to say that fault must forever remain irrelevant for Becca. 
As the tragedy recedes into the past, there will perhaps come a time 
when it is not unseemly for Becca to contemplate whether she was at 
fault in Danny’s death. Again, this inquiry will be relevant to her 
assessment of her culpability. But it is not clear that any other morally 
meaningful practical consequence follows.122 Will it then become 
appropriate for Becca to withdraw or disavow the contrition she 
displayed to her husband? To reclaim, say, the money for a scholarship 
fund the couple had established in Danny’s memory? To recast her 
anguish as the deeply irrational reaction of a parent in the haze of 
tragedy? It seems to me like none of these responses would be 
appropriate, because her initial reactions were not inappropriate. The 
question of whether Becca was or was not at fault is of very minor 
significance. There is a response that Becca owes simply in virtue of her 
causal and relational roles: Becca should experience guilt, and she 
should take herself to be blameworthy. 
By way of summary, notice just how far from the fault principle we 
have come: First, we have seen that one should take oneself to be 
blameworthy not only in proportion to the magnitude of one’s fault, but 
also in proportion to the strength of the relationship between the victim 
and oneself. Thus, Becca has reason to feel more guilt if it is she, rather 
than the lorry driver, who hits and kills Danny, even if neither knew that 
it was Danny who darted out into the road and both were driving with 
equally worn brakes. So the magnitude of warranted blame can vary in 
virtue of factors other than fault. Second, in judging whether one is 
blameworthy, one should operate with a sense of one’s agency 
responsive to the relationship between the victim and oneself. And where 
that relationship is especially central to one’s identity and one’s agency 
is especially implicated in the act that prompts the judgment—as was 
true in the case where Becca innocently kills Danny—the importance of 
fault can recede dramatically, perhaps even to the point of irrelevance. 
That is, the power of a particular relationship can provide all the warrant 
for self-blame that is required.  
 																																																								
122 Imagine that, in a bid to redress her role, Becca had gone to the DMV and insisted 
that they remove her driver’s license. Having now come to terms with the fact that she 
was not at fault, Becca might seek to have her license reinstated. That is a practical 
consequence that follows from her having assessed her culpability. But it is not a 
morally meaningful one. 
3. Self-Blame and Others’ Censure 
 
This Article thus far has focused on the first-person reactions of 
individuals who cause harm with little or no fault. Here, I consider 
whether third parties should countenance the reactions of the first parties 
or instead seek to correct them. And even if third parties conclude that 
the first parties are correct in seeing things the way they do, must third 
parties adopt the first parties’ perception in determining their own 
reactions? To put the matter concretely, if Becca concludes that she is 
liable to blame for causing Danny’s death because she is his mother, are 
we then licensed in blaming her even if she is not at fault by our lights? 
Even if she is not at fault even by her own lights? I address these 
questions here.  
To begin, I think that third parties should find it proper for Becca to 
experience guilt in the three variants discussed here—minor fault, 
uncertain fault, and no-fault scenarios. Given parental norms, the parent 
should feel guilty in the cases under discussion. Further, the parental role 
not only renders guilt appropriate from the first-person perspective that 
the parent inhabits; it is also a perspective that we ought to endorse her 
inhabiting. A reaction of parental guilt stemming from the parent’s 
enlarged conception of her own agency constitutes and reinforces the 
parent-child bond, and we have reason to value the parent-child bond. As 
such, we have reason to value the features of the relationship that compel 
its members to see their agencies as intertwined. We should, then, 
recognize that guilt is proper for Becca, and we should allow her to 
indulge it even if we do not believe her to be at fault.123 
Finally, it is not just that it would be good for Becca to experience 
guilt; it is also that it would be bad for her not to. Thus, for example, had 
Danny’s death been caused by a reckless driver, we would think it not 
only appropriate for the driver to experience guilt; we would also be 
licensed in judging him badly were he not to experience it. Similarly, 
since Becca’s guilt is fitting and it is proper, it is the emotion she ought 
to feel in response to her role in Danny’s death,124 on pain of disapproval 
by others, or at least those others who are close enough to her to express 
disapproval without being taken to be meddlesome.125  
Now, not everyone agrees that it would be proper to countenance 
first-personal guilt if the person who judges herself guilty would not be 
found to be at fault from a third-person perspective. To see this, consider 																																																								
123 The considerations adduced here are given an ampler airing supra Section III.A. 
124 To be sure, Becca’s grief might so overwhelm her guilt that the latter is not the 
emotion ready to hand. What matters is that Becca should be primed to feel guilt where 
her attention is turned to the moment of Danny’s death rather than the fact of it. 
125 See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which norms of 
privacy can foreclose reproach). 
Nancy Sherman’s searing descriptions of military commanders who lose 
members of their unit in battle where, at least from a third-party’s 
perspective, the soldiers’ deaths cannot be traced to any fault on the part 
of the commander.126 Oftentimes a commander in this situation will 
respond to these losses with profound guilt—guilt not unlike that of the 
parent who loses a child. While Sherman thinks the reaction 
understandable, she does not think it fitting, and so she thinks that the 
commander’s loved ones ought to help him move to a more detached 
perspective from which to judge himself.127 Once there, he can and 
should relinquish his guilt. Williams seems to have a similar take on 
whether we should countenance the lorry driver’s regret: While he 
acknowledges that the driver’s regret is called for, he also contends that 
others should nonetheless seek “to move the driver from this state of 
feeling.”128 
 The problem with Sherman’s position is that it denies the meaning 
of the relationship in question. For the commander to seek to move to a 
more detached position is for him to betray his soldiers, and to offend 
against the expectations inherent in the commander’s role. So too for 
Becca to seek to move to this more detached position would be for her to 
repudiate her parental role, and to do violence to the bonds of affection 
that allow her to inhabit the first-person perspective in the first place. 
The features of the relationship that cause the commander, or Becca, to 
judge themselves blameworthy are part and parcel of what make these 
relationships valuable. Neither can abandon the perspective from which 
he or she judges himself or herself  blameworthy without disavowing the 
relationship itself. No doubt the commander or Becca would experience 
far less pain if he or she were to “move on,” or “get over it.” But their 
present pain is of a piece with being in the relationship; because the 
relationship is itself valuable to each, each must affirm the pain it 
occasions in loss too. And because these are in general valuable 
relationships, we should affirm the features of the relationships that 
cause this pain too.129 Thus, in the case where Becca kills Danny through 
no fault of her own, we might nonetheless forbear from insisting too 																																																								
126 See, e.g., NANCY SHERMAN, AFTERWAR: HEALING THE MORAL WOUNDS OF OUR 
SOLDIERS 57–75 (2015). 
127 Nancy Sherman, Self-Empathy and Moral Repair, in EMOTION AND VALUE 183 
(Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd eds., 2014) (prescribing self-empathy as an antidote to 
what she deems the commanders’ “overbearing self-judgment,” id. at 191). 
128 WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 28. Cf. Scott A. Anderson, Rationalizing Indirect Guilt, 
33 VT. L. REV. 519, 543 (2009) (stating that institutions and laws should be used for 
this purpose, but to a lesser extent of trying to “assuage feelings of indirect guilt 
directly”).  
129 Cf. Holmes, Jr., supra note 90, at 357 (drawing a connection in the history of the 
doctrine of agency law between a commander’s liability for his “under-officers” and 
assignment of responsibility to the head of the family for other family members’ 
wrongs).  
heavily on her moral innocence in a bid to make her feel better. To be 
sure, we shouldn’t conceal that information; it just isn’t the right note to 
be hitting hard if we care about making Becca feel better. One can 
imagine Becca’s responding to the plea, “but it wasn’t your fault,” with 
incomprehension, as if it were no more than a non-sequitur, as it is from 
her perspective. And as indeed it should be.  
Should we also, then, blame Becca, as she blames herself? In other 
words, is indignation, which is the emotional correlate of blame for third 
parties to a wrong,130 proper for us?131 There are undoubtedly reasons to 
think indignation improper, not least of all the fact that Becca is already 
suffering enough. But even if, at the end of the day, we should renounce 
indignation and so not blame Becca, it is nonetheless important to note 
that there is a reason to blame her (though, again, a reason that gets 
defeated in light of Becca’s anguish).  
That reason flows from one of the functions of blame adduced in Part 
III—viz., the way in which blaming allows us to enforce norms 
constitutive of relationships we care about. I shall have more to say 
about this when we move to cases in which grief does not so readily 
outweigh the warrant for blame.132 
 
B. Disentangling Blame and Fault in Intimate Contexts: Parental 
Responsibility for Juvenile Crime  
 
What if one’s child is not victim but instead offender? Should one 
take on blame for a wrong one’s child commits on something like the 
reasons that prompt Becca to take on blame for accidental harm?133 
The adherent of the fault principle could answer that question in the 
affirmative: After all, the thought would go, doesn’t a child’s 
wrongdoing--a fortiori, his criminality--necessarily bespeak parental 
delinquency?134 But that thought is mistaken. As others have noted, good 																																																								
130 See, e.g., Strawson, supra note 67. 
131 We might put the difference between whether indignation is fitting and whether it is 
proper as a difference between whether the judged individual is blameworthy and 
whether we should blame her (whether or not we express that blame). For the latter 
distinction, see R. Jay Wallace, Dispassionate Opprobrium: On Blame and the Reactive 
Sentiments, in REASONS AND RECOGNITION: ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF T. M. 
SCANLON 348 (R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar & Samuel Freeman eds., 2011).  
132 See infra Section IV.C. 
133 I focus here on the parents of killers who have not yet reached adulthood because 
part of the rationale for parental guilt that I adduce goes to the overlap of agency 
between parents and children that is appropriate before one’s child has fully matured, 
but likely not appropriate thereafter. Still it is possible that other considerations ground 
parental guilt for the criminal acts of their adult children. I do not consider those cases 
here. 
134 Comments in the popular press certainly evince this line of thinking. For example, 
reactions to James Holmes’s mass killing in a Colorado movie theater included: “Where 
apples sometimes give rise to bad seeds.135 The question for our purposes 
is whether these good apples might nonetheless have convincing reasons 
to take themselves to be blameworthy for their children’s transgressions. 
My focus will thus be on those parents whose parenting practices have 
been at least acceptable, perhaps even unassailable, and who nonetheless 
should and sometimes do take themselves to be responsible for their 
children’s crimes. I note that some states permit the prosecution and 
punishment of parents whose adolescent children commit crimes, on the 
presumption that the crime entails some fault on the part of parents—in 
particular, inadequate supervision.136 While I ultimately conclude that it 																																																																																																																																							
were YOU Mother why didn’t you take care of him,” and “To me it sounds like a bad 
mother.” Tragedy Compounded: Killers’ Parents Become Instant Pariahs, NBC NEWS 
(July 25, 2012), http://vitals.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/07/25/12933951-tragedy-
compounded-killers-parents-become-instant-pariahs?lite.   
135 Andrew Solomon, who has interviewed the parents of teenage mass killers, argues 
that, in the typical case, it is wrong to think that these parents are at fault. “We often 
rush to blame parents in situations such as this one, but that is a grave mistake. Parents 
do not cause mental illness, and they are not responsible for the acts of their children.” 
Andrew Solomon, An Avoidable Tragedy: Aaron Alexis and Mental Illness, NEW 
YORKER, (Sept. 20, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/09/psychiatry-mass-shootings-
aaron-alexis-mental-illness.html. 
136 See generally Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Validity of Parental Responsibility 
Statutes and Ordinances Holding Parents Liable for Criminal Acts of Their Children, 
74 A.L.R.6th 181 (2012) (collecting and discussing cases that have considered the 
validity of parental responsibility statutes and ordinances holding parents liable for the 
criminal acts of their children); Tami Scarola, Creating Problems Rather Than Solving 
Them: Why Criminal Parental Responsibility Laws Do Not Fit Within Our 
Understanding of Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1029, 1041–45 (1997) (discussing 
different jurisdictional variances “in criminal parental responsibility laws”). 
These laws are then justified because, as one commentator puts it, “parents are 
largely to blame for the delinquent acts of their children.” Courtney L. Zolman, 
Comment, Parental Responsibility Acts: Medicine for Ailing Families and Hope for the 
Future, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 217, 219 (1998). For the view that parents should be 
criminally liable only where they culpably cause their children’s crimes, see, for 
example, S. Randall Humm, Comment, Criminalizing Poor Parenting Skills as a 
Means to Contain Violence by and Against Children, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1126 
(1991). 
But the notion of blanket parental culpability for crimes of their children is hardly 
uncontroversial. Historically, parents could not even be held civilly liable for their 
children’s acts unless they were found to have been at fault. See, e.g., James Herbie 
DiFonzo, Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Crime, 80 OR. L. REV. 1, 52 (2001) (“No 
matter how heinous the behavior of the child, unless the case fit within one of the 
specified exceptions [of authorization, ratification, provision of a dangerous instrument, 
or negligence proximately causing child’s act], the heart of the common law rule 
precluded parental liability without fault.”). But see Pamela K. Graham, Note, Parental 
Responsibility Laws: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1719, 
1725–26 (2000) (stating that all fifty states impose vicarious tort liability on parents for 
damages resulting from their children’s acts). And, indeed, resistance to visiting the 
sins of children upon their parents dates back to biblical times. See Deuteronomy 24:16 
would be inappropriate to prosecute faultless parents for crimes of their 																																																																																																																																							
(“The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put 
to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin.”); George P. 
Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of 
Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1548 (2002) (citing a similar verse from Ezekiel). 
For the view that the Deuteronomy verse pertains to giving incriminating testimony 
against one’s family member (or oneself) rather than incurring punishment on the basis 
of one’s relationship, see Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In the 
Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 955, 
976–77, 976 n.77 (1988). For contemporary doctrinal and scholarly statements 
eschewing the visitation of the sins of the father on his sons, see Amy L. Wax, The 
Two-Parent Family in the Liberal State: The Case for Selective Subsidies, 1 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 491, 525–27 (1996) (reviewing case law that refuses to treat illegitimacy as 
a bar to receiving statutory entitlements that a legitimate child would receive). 
For general scholarly commentary on parental responsibility laws, see Jennifer M. 
Collins, Ethan J. Leib, and Dan Markel, Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
1327, 1338–43 (2009) (collecting cites on parental responsibility). The authors offer 
their own critique, based on considerations of desert. See id. at 1384–89; see also Brian 
Neill, Comment, A Retributivist Approach to Parental Responsibility Laws, 27 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 119, 120 (2000) (arguing that parents should bear criminal responsibility 
for their children’s crimes only when parents have done wrong); Lisa Lockwood, 
Comment, Where Are the Parents? Parental Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of 
Children, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 497 (2000). Other arguments against parental 
responsibility laws express concern that they interfere with parental liberty, see, e.g., 
Leslie J. Harris, Making Parents Pay: Understanding Parental Responsibility Laws, 
FAM. ADVOC., Winter 2009, at 38; Kathryn J. Parsley, Note, Constitutional Limitations 
on State Power to Hold Parents Criminally Liable for the Delinquent Acts of Their 
Children, 44 VAND. L. REV. 441, 446 (1991), or will be used to go after disfavored 
individuals, especially single mothers of color, see, e.g., Leslie J. Harris, An Empirical 
Study of Parental Responsibility Laws: Sending Messages, But What Kind and to 
Whom?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 5, 10–11, 32; Naomi R. Cahn, Pragmatic Questions About 
Parental Liability Statutes, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 399, 418–23. (Ironically, the issue of 
teen violence seems to have garnered the appropriate level of national attention only in 
cases where the killers and their victims were white. See Michael Romano, No One 
Seems to Recognize Urban Violence: Minority Students See Double Standard After 
Columbine, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 16, 1999, at 32A, 1999 WLNR 807035.) 
Courts have diverged on the constitutionality of parental responsibility laws. 
Compare Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993) (upholding law over 
constitutional challenge) with Maple Heights v. Ephraim, 898 N.E.2d 974 (Ohio Ct. 
App., 2008) (overturning ordinance, even though it had permitted affirmative defense 
of doing everything in one's control, because there can be no culpability without fault 
under Ohio law). 
For commentary on the rationale behind these laws, see, for example, DiFonzo, 
supra note 136, at 6 (the “premise [of parental responsibility laws] is the empirically 
unsubstantiated assumption that juvenile delinquency results primarily from improper 
parental supervision”); id. at 41–49 (surveying research showing that the relationship 
between parenting and child criminality is far more complex than the simple causal 
story would indicate); cf. Cahn, supra note 136, at 414–15 (arguing that the laws in 
question are not status-based but instead turn on the omission of a legal duty that the 
parent owes his child). But see Collins, Leib & Markel, supra note 136, at 1339–40 
(identifying parental responsibility laws that do not require a showing of fault). 
children, that issue is not my concern in this Section.137 Here I seek to 
inquire into the moral emotional reactions these parents should 
experience, and the reaction victims’ families, as well as impartial 
parties, should have to them.   
The agonizing reflections of Sue Klebold are revealing here.138 Sue 
was the mother of Dylan Klebold, one of the two adolescent Columbine 
killers who shot and killed thirteen people before taking their own 
lives.139 Sue could not reasonably be found at fault for Dylan’s massacre. 
By all accounts, Sue and Tom Klebold were model parents.140 Theirs 
was described as a June and Ward Cleaver-ish household,141 and Sue 
describes Dylan as “this kind, goofy kid.”142 She maintains further that 
she and Tom were just as shocked as anyone else to learn that their child 
could embark upon a killing spree.143 And a Colorado commission 																																																								
137 I address parental criminal liability in the Conclusion. I contend that the compassion 
we owe the parents of an adolescent killer will almost surely outweigh the 
blameworthiness arising from the parental relationship. As such, I conclude that 
criminal liability is inappropriate.  
138 I focus here on Sue’s reactions, and not those of Dylan’s father, only because Sue 
has been much more vocal in interviews. It should not be inferred that the phenomena I 
mean to describe are peculiar to, or more strongly felt, by mothers. My larger interest is 
in parental guilt and blame. 
I note also that Sue’s reactions do not appear to be idiosyncratic. Other parents of 
adolescent killers voice sentiments of guilt similar to hers. See, e.g., TALHOTBLOND 
(Answers Productions 2009) (quoting the killer’s father saying that he felt guilt for his 
role in his son’s murderous act, even though the father’s involvement amounted to no 
more than providing his son with the computer the son used to find his prey—hardly 
grounds for fault). Still, it is difficult to find parents who are as open and eloquent as 
Sue Klebold; many parents in these cases decline to engage with the media at all. See, 
e.g., Sandhya Somashekhar & Sari Horwitz, A Year After Massacre, Family Lives ‘in 
Darkness,’ WASH. POST (April 12, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/04/11/AR2008041104103.html (reporting that the family of 
the Virginia Tech killer has refused the opportunity to be interviewed by reporters 
many times).  
139 See, e.g., DAVE  CULLEN, COLUMBINE 126 (2009). Eric Harris was the other killer.  
E.g., id. His parents have refused media interviews. See Dave Cullen, The Last 
Columbine Mystery, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 24, 2010), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/02/24/the-last-columbine-mystery.html.   
140 ANDREW SOLOMON, FAR FROM THE TREE: PARENTS, CHILDREN AND THE SEARCH 
FOR IDENTITY, 587–98 (2012). 
141 Id. at 592. 
142 Larry McShane, Sue Klebold, Mother of Columbine High School Shooter Dylan 
Klebold, Reveals She Prayed for Son's Death in New Book 'A Mother's Reckoning,’ 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Feb. 13, 2016,), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/mother-columbine-shooter-prayed-son-
death-article-1.2530656. 
143 Matthew Lysiak, This Child Will Bring Me a Terrible Sorrow, SLATE, (Mar. 9, 
2016), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/books/2016/03/a_mother_s_reckoning_by_sue_klebo
ld_reviewed.html. 
convened to study the Columbine killings concluded that no one could 
have anticipated the massacre, not even the killers’ parents.144 Finally, 
the killers themselves acknowledged that their parents bore no fault. In a 
video Dylan and Eric created in the days leading up to the shootings, 
Dylan predicted that his parents would say something in the aftermath 
like, “[i]f only we could have reached them sooner or found this tape,”145 
and he insisted that they were “great parents.”146 Eric apologizes to his 
parents and then goes on to exonerate them explicitly: “[t]here’s nothing 
you guys could’ve done to prevent this.”147 Borrowing language from 
Shakespeare, he reminds them that “[g]ood wombs hath borne bad 
sons.”148  
Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence that Sue Klebold and 
her husband were not at fault, she does not seek to disclaim. In 
interviews, she unflinchingly asserts, “I was the person who had raised ‘a 
monster.’”149 To be sure, she denies that she could have known of 
Dylan’s plans for his schoolmates, and so she does not believe that she 
could have done anything to stop him on the fateful day of his killing 
spree.150 But she is nonetheless gripped by the anguishing thought that at 
some level she and her husband could have done things differently and 
that, had they done things differently, the Columbine massacre would 																																																								
144 WILLIAM H. ERICKSON, THE REPORT OF GOVERNOR BILL OWENS’ COLUMBINE 
REVIEW COMMISSION 19 (2001), 
https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/Columbine%20-
%20Governor's%20Commission%20Report.pdf (“[T]here were indications that the pair 
had suicidal and violent tendencies. However, they managed successfully to mask their 
true intentions from their parents and school administrators and perhaps from the bulk 
of their fellow students . . . .”); cf. Lynn Bartels, Klebolds Never Knew, Friend Says, 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 26, 1999, at 5A, 1996 WLNR 823388 (stating that the 
parents did not know before the shooting of their son’s problems). Investigators also 
concluded that both sets of parents were “normal people who seem to care for their 
children and were involved in their life,” and they too “were fooled like everyone else.” 
Nancy Gibbs & Timothy Roche, The Columbine Tapes, TIME (Dec. 20, 1999), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,992873,00.html. Finally, it may 
be worth noting that Eric Harris’s parents enlisted a therapist for him, to help him with 
his anger issues. See Eric David Harris, A COLUMBINE SITE, 
http://www.acolumbinesite.com/eric.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2017). Thus, to the extent 
that the Harrises were aware that their son was troubled, they appear to have been 
addressing the situation responsibly. 
145 See Gibbs & Roche, supra note 144. At another point in the video, Klebold contends 
that his parents were the only ones who accepted him, while his extended family 
“treated him like the runt of the litter.” Id.  
146 Id. 
147 Id.  
148 Id. 
149 Susan Klebold, I Will Never Know Why, O, THE OPRAH MAG. (Nov. 2009), 
http://www.oprah.com/omagazine/susan-klebolds-o-magazine-essay-i-will-never-
know-why.  
150 Id. 
never have occurred.151 Some of these what-ifs include what moral 
philosophers refer to as “circumstantial luck.”152 (What if we had bought 
the house in California, rather than the one in Littleton, Colorado, all 
those years ago? Or, what if I had never met and married Dylan’s 
father?).153 But other what-ifs contemplate steps she and her husband 
might have taken that would perhaps have brought Dylan’s misery to 
light, and provided him with a way of coping that would have averted the 
disaster.154 This second source of anguish might be nothing other than 
wishful thinking, or “resultant luck”;155 at the very least, in the case of 
minimally decent parenting, onlookers would have no reason to judge 
that failing to have undertaken the imagined steps constitutes fault on the 
part of the Klebolds. And yet Sue is not prepared to see her lot as mere 
bad luck. Instead, parental guilt is tenacious for her, just as it was for 
Becca, and just as it should be. Again, parents have, and should have, an 
enlarged conception of their own agency at least in part because their 
children’s agency is reduced. Guilt is then fitting for Sue Klebold 
because she conceives of her agency, as manifested through Dylan, in 
appropriately expansive terms. 
For Sue, there are two possible objects of guilt—Dylan’s killings and 
his own death. Sue is unabashed about expressing her guilt over Dylan’s 
suicide. She says that if she could say one last thing to Dylan, “I would 
ask him to forgive me, for being his mother and never knowing what was 
going on inside his head, for not being able to help him, for not being the 
person he could confide in.”156  																																																								
151 Chillingly, though notably for the argument here, Dylan’s older brother, Byron, also 
expressed remorse for Dylan’s killings. Interview by Charles Gibson with Nathan 
Dykeman, on Good Morning Am. (Apr. 30, 1999), http://www.acolumbinesite.com/ 
dylan/aboutdylan.html. Byron had moved away from home a few months before the 
shootings and, as a close family friend reported, “he kind of—there was a gap in the 
friendship, and he kind of felt really guilty.” Id. It would be a stretch to infer that 
Byron’s departure, or even his withdrawal from the relationship (if indeed he did 
withdraw) culpably contributed to Dylan’s killings. So, the fact of Byron’s guilt speaks 
to our tendency to want to shoulder blame on behalf of our loved ones, even where we 
bear no obligation to see ourselves in their acts.   
152 Although the idea of circumstantial moral luck originates with Thomas Nagel, 
THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 34 (1979), the term itself was introduced by 
Daniel Statman. See Daniel Statman, Introduction to MORAL LUCK 1, 11 (Daniel 
Statman ed., 1993). 
153 See SOLOMON, supra note 140, at 597. 
154 See Klebold, supra note 149.  
155 See NAGEL, supra note 152, at 28–29; Michael J. Zimmerman, Luck and Moral 
Responsibility, in MORAL LUCK 217, 219 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993). The thought here 
is that other parents likely carried out their parenting roles no better than Sue did, but 
they had the good fortune to have well-adjusted kids, while she had the misfortune of 
having a child whose depression turned into a murderous rage. See McShane, supra 
note 142.  
156 Jessica Ferri, Columbine Shooter Dylan Klebold’s Parents Speak Out, YAHOO! 
By contrast, Sue’s guilt over Dylan’s killings is not as raw or as 
readily expressed as is her anguish over Dylan and the others’ deaths. 
Sue is caught in a position of dissonance: On the one hand, fighting to 
preserve her conception of herself as a good parent in the face of a public 
that is all too keen to blame and ostracize her,157 she has reason to insist 
that she is not at fault. Dylan’s acts were committed, Sue has said, “in 
contradiction to the way he was raised.”158 But notwithstanding her 
efforts to cast herself as faultless with respect to the killings, her 
comments sometimes betray her. Thus, for example, she states, “Dylan 
was a product of my life's work, but his final actions implied that he had 
never been taught the fundamentals of right and wrong. There was no 
way to atone for my son's behavior.”159 Elsewhere, she puts the point 
more succinctly: “We perceived his actions to be our failure.”160  
Reconciling her guilt with the thought that she was a good parent 
seems to require that she abandon either her guilt or her positive 
assessment of her parenting. As a good parent, and consistent with the 
fault principle, she dispenses with the latter. Sue feels guilt over, and 
believes she is guilty for, Dylan’s killings; she has been led to believe 
that guilt is appropriate only for those who are at fault; so she infers that 
she must be at fault. But even as she tries desperately to figure out where 
she went wrong, she comes up empty-handed.  
The better way for Sue to retain both her sense of blameworthiness 
and her belief in her good parenting is for her to recognize that hers is a 
case where the fault principle does not obtain. Sue is blameworthy 
simply because she is Dylan’s parent. The buck must stop with her. (So 
too for Dylan’s father.) She shares ownership of Dylan’s acts with Dylan 
simply in light of the enlarged sense of agency that, as we saw with 
Becca, parenting entails.161 And it is because Dylan’s acts are in some 																																																																																																																																							
STYLE (Nov. 14, 2012), https://ca.style.yahoo.com/blogs/parenting/columbine-shooter-
dylan-klebold-8217-parents-speak-191300537.html. 
157 See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Parents Blaming Parents, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 31,1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/31/magazine/parents-blaming-parents.html. One 
parent of a Columbine victim remarks, “They ask us if we blame the parents? . . . Who 
else do we blame? I taught my son right from wrong. My son wasn't shooting people 
up. My son was in the library doing what he was supposed to do.” Id. 
158 David Brooks, Columbine: Parents of a Killer, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/15/opinion/ columbine-parents-of-a-killer.html. 
159 Sarah LeTrent, A Killer in the Family, CNN, (Mar. 31, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/31/living/a-killer-in-the-family/. 
160 Klebold, supra note 149. 
161 David Enoch argues that a parent has a moral obligation to take responsibility and, if 
she does, she then becomes responsible for her son’s act. But if she declines to take 
responsibility, he continues, she is off the hook for her child’s murders, although not 
completely in the clear, because she remains culpable for breaching her obligation to 
take responsibility. See Enoch, supra note 17, at 102–03, 107. I think it problematic that 
Enoch’s account leaves it to the parent to choose whether she will be blameworthy for 
her child’s wrong or instead for failing to take responsibility for her child’s wrong. For 
sense hers, and not because she was a bad parent (again, she was not) 
that Sue should take herself to be blameworthy. 
In short, guilt is fitting for Sue not because she was at fault but 
simply because, as Dylan’s mother, she should see herself as implicated 
in his killings. Is Sue’s guilt proper? Is it the emotion she should 
experience, all things considered? Having found Becca’s guilt proper, 
there is no reason not to arrive at the same conclusion for Sue. In 
Becca’s case, we saw that grief was not a counterweight to guilt; instead, 
both arose from the same bonds. Here the same is true, and there is more 
for which Sue can feel guilty. But if it is fitting and proper for Sue to feel 
guilty, and so to take herself to be blameworthy, what does that entail for 
the way we should think about her? 
We have no reason to take Sue to be at fault. We should nonetheless 
acknowledge that it is fitting and proper for Sue to feel guilt, in light of 
the same considerations that underpin Sue’s guilt—namely, that this is 
the appropriate way to express the significance of her relationship with 
Dylan.162 As such, we should not try to encourage Sue to overcome her 																																																																																																																																							
one thing, the account thus has the implausible consequence of making all failures to 
take responsibility equally culpable, independent of the egregiousness of the act for 
which one declines to take responsibility. Thus, his account overlooks any reason we 
might have to think the parent’s failure to take responsibility for her son’s killing worse 
than her failure to take responsibility, say, for her son’s elbowing an opponent in 
basketball. 
Further, I believe that Enoch mischaracterizes the nature of the wrong involved in 
failing to take responsibility for the wrongs of one’s child. He writes: 
 
[T]he mere fact that these are actions of your children does not 
suffice for your being responsible. But if you do not incorporate them 
into your agency by taking responsibility for them, you are not 
thinking of yourself as a parent (in the normatively rich way needed 
here). And—being a parent—you should think of yourself as a parent. 
 
Id. at 126. In this way, the central wrong in declining to take responsibility, as Enoch 
sees it, seems to amount to no more than a failure of authenticity, or a failure to be true 
to what parenting requires. It is as if one were to reproach the parent who willfully 
starves her child to death for failing to live up to the standards of minimally decent 
parenting, but not for having caused the child’s death by starvation. Putting the point 
that way might do no more than underscore the difference between Enoch’s account 
and mine—namely, that he thinks the parent is not responsible until she takes 
responsibility, whereas I think of her responsibility as something that is already hers for 
the taking. But that is because I think the proper way to honor the parent-child 
relationship is not simply to reproach the parent who disclaims but also to impose upon 
her the responsibility she fails to take on herself. I make the case for imposing 
relationally-based responsibility on one who shirks it when I turn to the example of the 
CEO. See infra note 177. 
162 Enoch and I are closer on this point. He writes: “without the power—and sometimes 
also the duty—to take responsibility for one’s children’s actions, the nature of 
parenthood would have been significantly different, and not, it seems to me, for the 
better.” Enoch, supra note 161, at 124. 
guilt, as we would in the case of someone who had unreasonably taken 
on blame. Further, there is a reason for us to blame Sue: among other 
possible goods, blaming Sue affirms the good of the parent-child bond. 
But, importantly, that reason is defeasible. Whether we should all things 
considered, blame Sue will turn, as it did with Becca, on a calculus about 
how the good of blame here fares against whatever reasons we have to 
withhold blame—compassion, in particular.163 I do not endeavor to work 
out which way the scales should tip at the end of the day, for Sue or for 
other parents of adolescent killers. The important point is that there is 
warrant for blaming Sue independent of her being at fault. Extending the 
analysis, we can see that it is at least theoretically possible that the 
reason to blame the faultless parent of an adolescent killer will outweigh 
the reason we have to withhold blame. For example, if the killer survives 
his massacre and if his parents fail to demonstrate remorse, we might 
enforce the norm of taking on blame for the wrong of one’s child by 
imposing upon the parents the blame they have so far refused to 
shoulder. And we would do this by blaming them.  
With that said, one might still wonder why censure is the appropriate 
way to affirm the parental bond. In response, I note that the claim here is 
not that censure is the only way to affirm the parental bond, just as guilt 
is not the only response appropriate for the parent of the adolescent 
murderer. In addition to guilt, the parent should adopt the perhaps heroic 
stance of persisting in her love and support for her child notwithstanding 
his monstrous acts. And she should display loyalty to her child; she 
should zealously voice any considerations that might mitigate his guilt. 
Each of these responses is appropriate in the circumstance as each 
expresses the proper appreciation of the values at issue. For that reason, 
we should support the parent in all of this. We should recognize the 
propriety in her responses if she offers them, and apply normative 
pressure if she does not. And, again, we should blame her if the 
countervailing reasons for withholding blame do not rule it out.164 
Still, one might wonder why blame should even be a candidate 
response among the options we have. Blame’s connection to bloodlust 
might cause the more compassionate among us to recoil from the notion 
of heaping blame upon a parent as bewildered and broken-hearted as Sue 
Klebold.165 Surely there are more productive responses. Columbine itself 
provides an example: the school library, where a majority of the students 
were killed, was walled off in the aftermath of the shootings, and parents 
engaged in an effort to raise funds to build a new library—one that 
																																																								
163 The fact that Sue lost a child in the killings too might be thought reason to withhold 
blame.  
164 See supra text accompanying note 146. 
165 See, e.g., Christopher, supra note 29. 
would not loom as so bloody a reminder of the massacre.166 Should the 
Klebolds and Harrises have sought to take part in this effort, perhaps 
even donating more than any other family? Why wouldn’t that have been 
a more appropriate way for them to take responsibility? Why need they 
instead hold themselves out as targets of blame? 
The answer to these questions is something like the thought that 
arose in response to the lorry driver who took himself to be no 
differently situated from an onlooker.167 The lorry driver killed the child, 
however innocently, whereas the onlooker did not. That he did so 
changes the “normative landscape” for him.168 He can come to owe 
duties of apology and repair to the victim’s family that a mere bystander 
does not owe. Moreover, this would be true even if his own child, sitting 
in the cab next to him, died as a result of the accident as well. His loss, 
that is, would not undercut the fact of his obligations to the victim’s 
family.  
By the same token, the Klebolds’ loss does not put them in the same 
boat as the other grieving parents. They owe something in virtue of their 
relationship to the killer. Other cases involving adolescent killers bear 
this out. For example, it is not uncommon for the parents of these killers 
to experience remorse. Thus, statements released by the parents of James 
Cho, the Virginia Tech killer, and Jared Loughner, the man who shot 
Gabrielle Giffords, each express contrition for their son’s acts.169 In a 
similar vein, Peter Lanza, estranged father of Sandy Hook killer, Adam 
Lanza, was described as “wracked by guilt, confusion[,] and grief” a year 
after his son’s massacre.170 Further, many families in this situation try to 
make amends. For example, Peter Rodger, whose son, Elliot Rodger, 																																																								
166 The fundraising effort was successful. The old library was completely removed, and 
replaced with an airy atrium. An addition was then built onto the west side of the school 
to house a new library. That library was ready in time for the start of the next school 
year. It is called the “HOPE Columbine Memorial Library” and it is dedicated to the 
memories of those who were killed in the shootings. See HOPE Columbine Memorial 
Library, A COLUMBINE SITE, http://www.acolumbinesite.com/library.html (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2016).  
167 See supra note 92–95 and accompanying text. 
168 See DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE 238 n.13 (2012)  
169 See John Esterbrook, Virginia Tech Gunman: Background, CBS NEWS (Apr. 18, 
2007), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/virginia-tech-gunman-background/ (reproducing 
Cho family statement); Susan Gembrowski, Marisol Bello & Trevor Hughes, A Closer 
Look at Aurora Shooting Suspect James Holmes, USA TODAY (July 21, 2012), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-07-20/colorado-shooting-
holmes/56373668/1 (reproducing Holmes family statement). 
170 Daniel Bates, Exclusive - Adam Lanza's Father is a 'Broken Man' Wracked by Guilt 
Since Sandy Hook Massacre: Family Reveal What It's Like to Live with One of the Most 
Hated Names in America, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 2, 2013), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2515675/Adam-Lanzas-father-broken-man-
Sandy-Hook-murder-spree-family-reveal-like-live-hated-names-
America.html#ixzz2rz3BZ1MG. 
shot and killed six people in Santa Barbara, developed “a small website 
with resources on mental illness and a place to share stories” in an effort 
to help families identify and address mental illness in one of their loved 
ones.171 In 2016, Sue Klebold published a memoir of her experience of 
the Columbine massacre, and she directed all proceeds from the book to 
charities focusing on mental health issues.172 All of this suggests that, 
even when these parents lose their own child as a result of his killings, 
they do not conceive of themselves as mere victims. Instead, they take on 
some responsibility for their children’s crimes. The foregoing has 
endeavored to explain why they are right to have done so.  
 
C. Blame and Fault for Corporate Wrongs 
 
We have been surveying cases involving intimates, and governed by 
the messy and sometimes discordant norms that reign in the intimate 
sphere. I turn now to what may seem a quite different context—that of 
the corporation—to determine how the dynamics already described 
might play out there.  
Suppose that a corporation has committed a crime—for example, in 
one of its many factory plants, the foreman has failed to supply workers 
with adequate safety gear that he knows they need, and one of them has 
died as a result. The corporation is convicted of involuntary 
manslaughter,173 and it is time to assign responsibility for the crime to 
the corporation’s members. The crime’s individual perpetrators are, of 
course, the most likely and deserving candidates. But perhaps others in 
the corporation deserve blame too.174 Consider here the responsibility of 
the CEO, for he is situated most similarly to the parent or the military 
commander whom we have already contemplated: Like each of these 
other characters, the CEO has a reason to see his agency as overlapping 
with the agency of those with whom he is in a particular relationship—in 
his case, with those in his employ—as regards the acts they undertake in 
the course of their employment. The cause of the overlap is not, of 																																																								
171 Peter Rodger, Santa Barbara Shooter’s Father's Open Letter: 'We Have to Stop 
This,' ABC NEWS (June 27, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/US/santa-barbara-shooters-
fathers-open-letter-stop/story?id=24319895. 
172 McShane, supra note 142.  
173 The facts here reflect those in People v. O’Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1990); see also Jay C. Magnuson & Gareth C. Leviton, Policy Considerations in 
Corporate Criminal Prosecutions After People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc., 62 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 914 (1987) (describing further details from O’Neill). 
174 Desert is the crucial notion here. Others urge for the prosecutions of executives on 
deterrence grounds. See, e.g., Rena Steinzor, Kill a Worker? You're Not a Criminal. 
Steal a Worker's Pay? You Are One., HUFFINGTON POST (July 20, 2016), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rena-steinzor/kill-a-worker-youre-not-a-criminal-steal-
a-workers-pay-you-are-one_b_7813966.html (“[J]ail time for their senior managers will 
get their attention, even if the sentences are only for a few months.”). 
course, the moral immaturity of his subordinates, as it is for the parent; it 
is instead the fact that he, in a sense similar to the commander, guides 
what his employees do while they are on the job. This is not to suggest 
that he authorizes, or indeed that he is even aware of, their day-to-day 
activities. Nonetheless, they act under his authority—he could explicitly 
alter their activities if he so chose, and they act to carry out a vision and 
mission for the corporation of which he is, during his tenure as CEO, 
principal author.175  
Now, none of that establishes anything more than a tenuous causal 
connection between the CEO and his employee’s acts. And this tenuous 
connection may be all that we, outsiders to the corporation, can discern 
about the CEO’s role in the crime, given the complex network of 
interactions within the corporate web. But suppose we could see just 
what the nature of the relationship was between what the CEO had done 
(or not done) and the crime that was committed. We would then have 
learned something useful about the responsibility he bears qua individual 
(was he a perpetrator? facilitator? authorizer? etc.). But, importantly, we 
would not have learned anything useful about the responsibility he bears 
qua chief officer of the corporation. Indeed, to treat him as he deserves 
in virtue of his role in this context is to refrain from seeking to arrive at 
an individualized assessment of his responsibility. 
Group membership is valuable; participating with others in a shared 
endeavor, under the aegis of an entity that subsumes the identities of 
each individual into a unified whole, provides value and meaning. This 
kind of group experience requires members to recognize that the group 
acts on their behalf; that its acts are theirs. Corporations are one such 
group, at least for a core set of members who are positioned to form or 
inform the group’s identity—executives in particular.   
The CEO, like the parent or military commander, ought to act with 
an enlarged conception of his agency, such that he sees those acts of his 
employees that are attributable to the corporation as his own. This 
enlargement of agency flows from the authority he enjoys over his 
employees. But there is a second reason for him to conceive of his 
agency in expanded terms, and it is one that applies to all group members 
who are expected to harbor a commitment to the corporation. These 
members ought to view themselves in the corporation’s acts because 
doing so affirms the solidarity and loyalty that makes group membership, 																																																								
175 This is true even if the CEO inherits the corporate mission from his predecessor and 
changes it not one whit. Because the CEO is empowered to change the mission, his 
retention of it as-is is akin to his having adopted it as his own. I note also that this way 
of construing the CEO’s authority aligns with the one that the Supreme Court adopts 
when it contemplates the responsible corporate officer doctrine, a doctrine permitting 
prosecution of punishment of corporate officers for crimes of the corporation these 
officers neither participated in nor culpably failed to prevent. See, e.g., United States v. 
Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975). 
including membership in a corporation, valuable.176 And if all this is true 
of the generic group member, it should hold even more so for the leader 
of a group, like the CEO, from whom the expected commitment to the 
shared project is probably strongest.177 
Further, given the value in these relationships, we have reason to 
honor them. In this case, that means viewing the CEO qua group 
member, rather than judging him as an isolated individual, on the basis 
of what he himself did or did not do. We should affirm the CEO’s 
forsaking his entitlement to an individual assessment, and we should do 
so by going along with it—by judging him alongside his fellows. So it is 
that we may praise or blame the CEO in virtue of what the corporation 
has done, and without regard to what he has or has not done.  
Of course, all of this presumes that the CEO willingly accepts blame, 
and we defer to his judgment as a matter of aligning ourselves with the 
values that prompt him to do so. But the CEO might not do what he 
ought. What then? 
This is a situation where it is perfectly appropriate to enforce his 
obligation to take on blame, and to do so by blaming him. Here, unlike in 
the family contexts already discussed, we need not worry about over-
stepping intimate boundaries. Moreover, we do not occupy the stance of 
mere disinterested observers. The CEO owes it to his fellow members to 
accept blame; by doing so he affirms his conception of the corporation as 
a team, whose members stand or fall together. But his fellow members 
are not the ones with a grievance—instead, the family members of the 
victim are the ones most immediately in need of the CEO’s taking on 
blame. And, as with other cases in which a grave wrong has been 
committed, the community at large is entitled to hold those responsible 
for it to account.178 It is then not only that the CEO ought to take on 
blame; it is that he owes it to us to do so. This changes our position vis-
à-vis enforcing his obligation. 
Will our blaming him be effective in putting him in the position he 
should occupy, and would have occupied had he recognized that he was 
blameworthy? I think it will. In refusing to take on blame, the CEO has 
more than he deserves, and we, as those whom the corporation’s crime 
has offended, have less. Enforcing his obligation to take on blame by 
blaming him thus has three positive effects for us. First, it entails that he 
loses some moral credit. Second, blaming him entails that we have our 
injury (that of the offense against our shared moral prohibitions, if not 
also our criminal laws) recognized. Finally, blaming the CEO gives us an 																																																								
176 See Sepinwall, Crossing the Fault Line, supra note 18, at 467–69. 
177 I elaborate on this point in Crossing the Fault Line. Id. The argument in the 
paragraph following the text accompanying this note largely tracks a similar argument 
there.  
178 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
opportunity to affirm the importance of the bonds of solidarity that ought 
to have compelled the CEO to take on blame in the first place.  
In short, given that the CEO ought to see himself in the acts of his 
employees carried out in the scope of the business, he ought to take 
himself to be blameworthy for the crime they carried out on the 
corporation’s behalf. And given that the norms underpinning his taking 
on blame are ones we have reason to value, we should take his 
blameworthiness at his word. Or, if he shirks the blame he should 
shoulder, we should blame him nonetheless (or, better still, all the more). 
Further, the CEO’s judgment should elide considerations of fault 
altogether. In taking himself to be blameworthy, the CEO does not adopt 
the belief, or even commit himself to coming to adopt the belief, that he 
is at fault. The situation is unlike the Becca variant who, faced with the 
question of whether she could have prevented Danny’s death, errs on the 
side of treating her agency expansively, not because the evidence points 
clearly in that direction but because, for a parent, that is the correct 
direction in which to err. Becca thus chooses to believe that she is at 
fault. But the CEO’s taking on blame should not be a matter of choice in 
this way; it should not be responsive to facts that go to the CEO’s 
contribution to the crime. Instead, as CEO, he should automatically take 
himself to be blameworthy, even if he could not have done anything to 
prevent the corporation’s crime. He is situated differently from Becca 
because he represents a group, and the stance of solidarity he owes to the 
other group members entails that he should take on responsibility 
independent of his fault. The crime is his regardless. When it comes to 
the acts of those with whom he shares agency, the buck stops with him. 
This is not to suggest that whether the CEO contributed wrongly to 
the corporation’s crime is of no moment. To the contrary, facts about his 
personal culpability are deeply relevant to an inquiry into the blame he 
deserves qua individual. If he is personally culpable, so much the worse 
for our assessment of him.179 And he should seek to assess his own 
culpability, as a matter of seeking to prevent a like crime in the future. 
But the important point for present purposes is that independent of (or 
over and above) whatever blame he deserves in light of his own 
wrongdoing, the CEO must take himself to deserve blame for the 
corporation’s crimes because he must see that his agency is reflected in 
the corporation’s acts, and he must see this not because he wrongly 
contributed to the corporation’s crime but just because his seeing this is 
what the norms and obligations of his role require. It is in this way that 
the CEO is blameworthy independent of whether he is at fault. 
Much of this might seem foreign, perhaps given the ease with which 																																																								
179 This point is consonant with a theme in HONORÉ, supra note 117, at 31 (“[I]t is a 
myth that fault and desert are essential to responsibility. They serve rather to increase 
the credit or discredit for the outcome of our behaviour that we incur in any event.”). 
corporate CEOs apologize on behalf of their corporations while carefully 
avoiding statements suggesting that they themselves are guilty.180 But it 
is a commonplace in other cultures, captured most notably, perhaps, in 
the Japanese ritual of shintai ukagai, in which corporate officials bow in 
apology, and sometimes even submit letters of resignation, in response to 
corporate wrongdoing, independent of their participation in that 
wrongdoing.181 The foregoing makes clear the moral stance 
underpinning the recognition that one owes an apology for the crime of 
one’s corporation, and it allows us to see the good in that stance. 
 
D. The Tenacity of Fault 
 
In all of these examples, the temptation to shoehorn the facts such 
that they fit within the bounds of the fault principle is tantalizing, 
perhaps even inescapable. One way to do so involves adopting an ever 
more expansive conception of fault. Thus, an adherent of the fault 
principle might agree that the occupant of certain relationships or roles, 
like the CEO, or parent, or military commander, is subject to more-
stringent-than-normal standards. But he will then argue that the 
corporation’s (or the child’s or one’s soldiers’) wrong just is evidence 
that the CEO (or the parent or commander) must have fallen short of 
these standards. Further, his having fallen short just is what constitutes 
his fault. He is blameworthy, but blameworthy in just the way the 
garden-variety wrongdoer is—because he is at fault.  
Before addressing this effort to resist the idea of faultless liability to 
blame, I note its polar opposite, which is nonetheless its soul sister—
namely, the claim that none of the characters under discussion is in fact 
blameworthy or at fault: on this line of argument, the characters suffer 
from a kind of neuroticism. All of them might think themselves subject 
to peculiarly high standards that they have failed to meet, but we have no 
reason to affirm these enhanced standards, and so no reason to think 
these characters either at fault or to blame.  																																																								
180 See, e.g., Darryl Koehn, Why Saying “I’m Sorry” Isn’t Good Enough: The Ethics of 
Corporate Apologies, 23 BUS. ETHICS Q. 239 (2013) (finding it crucial to point out that 
“[a]ccepting blame is part of what it means to be held accountable.”). 
181 See, e.g., Jeff Kingston, Toyota Bows and the Japanese Art of Apology, BBC NEWS 
(Feb. 10, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/8508531.stm 
(describing the various cultural meanings of bowing, and noting that Toyota President 
Akio Toyoda was criticized for failing to demonstrate sufficient humility in the press 
conference he gave apologizing for Toyota’s brake problems); see also JON P. ALSTON 
& ISAO TAKEI, JAPANESE BUSINESS CULTURE AND PRACTICES: A GUIDE TO TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY JAPANESE BUSINESS 40 (2005); BOYE LAFAYETTE DEMENTE, 
JAPANESE ETIQUETTE & ETHICS IN BUSINESS 181 (6th ed. 1994). See generally Amy J. 
Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of 
Corporate Crime, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 411, 433 (2012) (describing practices of corporate 
apology). 
These twin efforts to escape the notion of faultless blame—again, the 
first recasting fault so that it applies to the protagonists in the scenarios 
here and the second diagnosing our protagonists with a paranoia that 
falsifies their judgments of blame—reflect the remarkable tenacity of the 
fault principle. The first strategy sees fault as so essential to warranted 
blame that it stretches the notion of fault beyond recognition. And yet the 
devotee of the fault principle who is willing to stretch the notion of fault 
this far has essentially adopted the view I have articulated, albeit without 
abandoning the terminology of the traditional account. Still, I doubt that 
most adherents of the fault principle would so readily agree that fault is 
as broad as it must be in order to find it within the scenarios examined 
here. 
The critic who denies that there is fault in these scenarios and instead 
sees only neuroticism is not so easily appeased. It is not clear what more 
can be said to convince this critic that Becca, Sue, the military 
commander, the CEO, and so on are not merely self-aggrandizing 
narcissists who take on responsibility that is not in fact theirs. I have 
endeavored to show that their judgments of blame constitute appropriate 
responses given the norms and values that underpin the relationships in 
which they happen to find themselves. The critic who disagrees cannot 
dismiss these cases simply by assigning a psychological pathology to one 
who would judge themselves as Becca, the CEO, and the others should. 
This critic must instead take on the conception of the relationships and 
their governing norms that I have advanced, and demonstrate that these 
are in some way mistaken. If nothing else, then, the argument here 
should at least shift the burden of persuasion to the person who would 
deny that, at least in the cases under discussion, one can be blameworthy 
even without fault. It is perhaps not overly modest to content oneself 
with having done no more than burden shifting when the burden one has 
shifted lay so entirely on one’s side at the outset.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The foregoing has involved an extended inquiry into whether fault 
and blame can come apart. I have endeavored to show that they can and 
do. This leaves us with four characters (Becca, Sue, the commander, and 
the CEO) who are blameworthy even though none of them would be 
deemed at fault under the fault principle. Of course, the fault principle is 
not first and foremost a principle about just blame; it is instead a 
principle about just punishment. Which if any of the four characters 
should we look to punish? 
The answer, I believe, is straightforward albeit anticlimactic for that 
very reason. As the fault principle says, we should punish only those 
who are blameworthy. I have shown how each of the protagonists here 
can be blameworthy. But being blameworthy is but a necessary condition 
for being appropriately subject to punishment. Having seen that this 
necessary condition can be satisfied in the cases involving our four 
characters, we must then turn to the other considerations that govern 
whether some blameworthy species of conduct ought to receive the 
response of the criminal law. There is nothing unique to be said here, 
notwithstanding the fact that the genesis of the warrant for blame lies 
partly or entirely outside of the realm of fault. Instead, whether or not 
blame should result in criminal liability in these cases is determined by 
whatever garden variety considerations we bring to bear in determining 
the scope of the criminal law more generally—by assessing the 
magnitude of harm involved, the effectiveness of addressing this harm 
through criminalization,182 application of other rationales for 
punishment, the implications for individual liberty of criminalization, 
and so on. 
I do not undertake to work out these considerations here, but I will 
venture my best guesses as to the results: I think it unsurprising that we 
are loath to enforce the norms of parenting through criminal law, at least 
where we outsiders have no reason to think that parents are at fault. We 
view these spheres as intimate spaces, we are right to do so, and so 
government intervention would both be unwelcome and perhaps also 
ineffective, because the meaning of the bonds we seek to enforce would 
be undercut through the enforcement.  
But these considerations might well go the other way when it comes 
to executive criminal liability. The wrongs for which CEOs ought to 
accept blame sometimes involve massive harm—one need only look at 
the acts of fraud that partly precipitated the financial crisis to see this.183 																																																								
182 There is of course a famous debate between H.L.A. Hart and Patrick Devlin about 
whether the criminal law should be used to enforce moral or social norms. Compare 
H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 57 (1963) (arguing that criminal law 
should not be used to police morality, especially as regards acts that create no harm to 
others) with PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 2–3 (1965) (defending 
the use of criminal law for the enforcement of moral norms). Given that affirmation or 
enforcement of relationship norms provides a key rationale for faultless blame here, the 
debate is obvious relevance. But again, the debate is independent of the question of 
whether one can be blameworthy without fault. I note as well that, assuming that at 
least some moral norms are appropriately safeguarded or promoted through criminal 
law, there is still a question as to which moral norms we should safeguard or promote. 
Other scholars have critiqued the Devlin approach on the ground that the criminal law 
has historically sought to uphold norms that reflect a heteronormative, conservative 
perspective on sex, see, e.g., Melissa Murray, Griswold's Criminal Law, 47 CONN. L. 
REV. 1045 (2015), and the family, see, e.g., Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, 
Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L. J. 1236 (2010). I wholeheartedly agree with 
the critiques these scholars offer. The claim that the criminal law should promote some 
relational norms does not commit me to the claim that the relational norms the criminal 
law currently promotes are the right ones. 
183 See generally Sepinwall, Crossing the Fault Line, supra note 18, at 478. 
Prosecuting and punishing CEOs would have undeniable deterrent 
effects.184 Relative to punishing the corporation itself, which, famously 
has “no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked,”185 punishing the 
CEO would provide a far more meaningful and satisfying target for the 
anger that the corporate crime has elicited. And liberty considerations 
would not decisively cut against criminal liability, especially because 
CEO convictions need not entail jail time, and especially given that 
CEOs are already subject to civil sanctions for many of the offenses for 
which they would be prosecuted under the account I have advanced. All 
of this to say that these considerations amount to at least a colorable 
argument in favor of punishing CEOs who are to blame without fault.  
As a society, we have not explored these considerations in thinking 
about the response to corporate crime because we have taken the fault 
principle to act as a side-constraint on the permissibility of punishment. 
But one way to understand the efforts here would be to see them as an 
argument in favor of replacing the fault principle with what might be 
called the blame principle. Like the fault principle, the blame principle 
would stand as a side-constraint on permissible punishment. But it would 
hold not that one may be punished only if one is at fault but instead that 
one may be punished only if one is to blame. One can be to blame (i.e., 
blameworthy) even if one is not at fault. A CEO, in particular, can be to 
blame even if he is not at fault. And if he is, and if other considerations 
militate in favor of our responding to him through the criminal law, then 
we would do him no injustice by punishing him, and we would do much 
justice for everyone else as a result. 
 
																																																								
184 See, e.g., Nocera, supra note 25 (finding criminal convictions do not have much of 
an effect on companies because no individual is punished); 155 CONG. REC. S2315–16 
(daily ed. Feb. 13, 2009) (statement of Sen. Kaufman) (describing the statement of Neil 
Barofsky, former federal prosecutor and inspector general of the financial bailout funds, 
who “suggested the best way to clean up mortgage fraud is to pursue licensed 
professionals in the industry, and make examples of them [as] ‘[t]hey have the most to 
lose, they’re the most likely to flip, and they make the best examples’”). 
185 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body To Kick”: An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 
386, 386 (1981) (quoting Edward Thurlow, First Baron Thurlow). 
